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LOCKE,

~

, e t':ci_

<ill. ( · ~gnts
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1.

Federal/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY: · Appellant challenges the DC's decision

declaring a portion of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act

(

of 1976 unconstitutional.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Section 314 of the Federal

(

Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, codified at 43

\

u.s.c~

§1744, was designed to alleviate the problems caused by the
encumbrance of federal lands with numerous unpatented mining
claims.

The existence of thes unknown claims made it difficult

for federal land managers to take actions affecting federal land
for fear of interfering with the rights accorded to claimants
under the federal mining laws.

Each time the Bureau of Land

Management proposed a sale or other conveyance of land, it was
necessary to make a lengthy search of county records and to
initiate a mining contest to determine the validity of any claims
uncovered in the search.
Section 314 was enacted to provide a federal recordation
system and rid federal lands of stale mining claims.

(

Section

314(a) requires the owners of unpatented claims located prior to
October 21, 1976, within three years of that date and "prior to
December 31, of each year therafter," to file with BLM a notice of
intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work
performed on the claim.

The same yearly filing requirement was

placed on holders of claims located after October 21, 1976.
Section 314(b) required the holder of a claim to file an official
record of the notice of location or certificate of location within
90 days of location.

Those whose claims were located before

October 21, 1976, were given three years from that date to comply
with this filing requirement.
r~quirements

(

Failure to file with the

of § 314 (a) and (b) was "deemed conclusively to

constitute an abandonment of the mining claim ••• by the owner,"
except in certain enumerated circumstances.

The BLM promulgated

regulations providing that the owner of an unpatented mining claim
located on federal land on or before October 21, 1976, must file
the documents required by§ 314(a) on or before October 22, 1979,
and "on or before December 30 of each calendar year" thereafter.
Appellees are mining claimants whose ten unpatented claims
were located on federal lands in Nevada in 1952 and 1955.

On

October 19, 1979, they complied with the initial filing
requirements for pre-October 21, 1976, claims.

In 1980, however,

appellees waited until December 31 to hand deliver their
affidavits of annual assessment work to the Nevada BLM office,
thus missing the deadline by one day.

On April 4, 1981, the BLM

informed appellees that their claims had been declared abandoned
and void because they had failed to file the requisite documents
by December 30, 1980.
Appellees sought review of the BLM action, claiming that they
were erroneously advised of the filing date by unnamed BLM
personnel and that

§

314 and the implementing regulations are

unconstitutional and invalid because they resulted in taking
appellees' property without notice and opportunity to be heard.
The Interior Board of Land Appeals affirmed the BLM determination.
Appellees filed this action in the DC.
judgment for appellees, holding that

§

The DC granted summary
314 is an "unconstitutional

violation of procedural due process insofar as it creates an
irrebuttable

presu~ption

of abandonment for failure to timely file

the annual assessment notice."

(

Vlandis v. Kline, 412

u.s.

Applying the analysis set forth in

441 (1973), the DC determined that

extinguishment of claims pursuant to § 314 amounts to a taking

without due process because the statute creates a

constructi~e

presumption of abandonment that is "not necessarily or universally
true in fact" and because BLM could easily notify claimants of
their failure to meet a filing deadline and hold a preforfeiture
hearing in cases in which there is a dispute over whether an
abandonment has occurred.

The DC went on to hold that even if

appellees had not been deprived of their due process rights, they
would still prevail because they had substantially complied with

§

314 by submitting the required notices one day after the statutory
deadline.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG argues that the issue here is

substantial because the DC's decision prevents uniform
administration of the federal recordation system and undermines

(
~

the administrative workability of the system in Nevada.

The

decision also casts doubt on the status of approximately 40,000
mining claims previously determined to be invalid because of the
failure of claimants to make timely annual filings.

The DC

decision makes § 314 a virtual nullity and returns Nevada to the
situation that existed prior to passage of § 314.
The DC's decision is erroneous.

The power of Congress to

manage and control the mineral resources of the public domain is
very broad.

Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426

u.s.

529, 539 (1976).

This

extensive power is clearly broad enough to encompass§ 314, which
conditions retention of unpatented mining claims on the
claimiant's compliance with filing deadlines, for the Court has

(

held that state governments, in legislating with respect to
privately held land, have the power "to condition retention of a

-

(

J

-

property right upon the performance of an act within a limited
period of time."

Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454

u.s.

516, 529 (1982).

A fortiori, imposition of such a condition is within the power of
Congress over the public domain.
Conditioning retention of unpatented mining claims on the
filing of annual notice is fully consistent with due process
requirements.

Termination of stale claims provides the only

reliable tool for enforcement of the filing requirements and thus
is essential to an "accurate and perpetual inventory of mining
claims on the public lands of those persons who assert an interest
in [such] claims."

Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F.

Supp. 309, 314 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd 649 F.2d 775 (CAlO 1981).
The statute itself provides notice to claimnats of the

(
~

consequences of failure to make timely filings.

Due process does

not require individualized notice to claimants that they risk
invalidation of their claims if they do not meet the statutory
filing deadline.
The irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis has no
application in this case.

The DC reasoned that

§

314 creates a

conclusive presumption of abandonment that is not necessarily or
universally true in fact since failure to make a timely filing
does not always signify intent to abandon a claim.

Congress,

however, did not make the invalidation of a claim turn on
abandonment or intent to abandon, but solely on whether the
claimant had met the statutory filing requirements.

(

Similarly,

since termination turns on failure to file rather than on intent
to abandon, notice and opportunity to prove nonabandonment are

unnecessary.

Even if such procedures were useful, they would not

be reasonable, since they would impose the same burden on BLM the
statute was designed to alleviate.
The DC's alternative holding, that appellees substantially
complied with the statutory requirements is inconsistent with
Congress' goal of enabling BLM to obtain complete and up-to-date
information on the status of the mining claims on federal lands.
The DC's failure to define the boundaries of "substantial
compliance" leaves that task to BLM.

Regardless of what grace

period BLM chose, there would always be a claimant who filed a day
or two after its expiration.

Case-by-case determinations of

substantial compliance would be very burdensome.
Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400

u.s.

The DC relied on

48, 57 (1970), in which the

(

Court stated that substantial compliance is sufficient to meet the

~

annual assessment work requirement of the general mining law, 30

u.s.c.

28.

The applicable statute in Hickel conditioned retention

of unpatented mining claims on performance of assessment work "in
compliance with the laws," not on filing of particular documents.
Section 314(c), moreover, expressly provides that failure to meet
the filing requirements "shall be deemed conclusively" to
constitute abandonment of the claim.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The SG has made a convincing case with

respect to both the merits and the significance of the case.
motion to dismiss or affirm has been · filed.
Court call for a response.

(

I recommend that the

Unless that response points out flaws

in the SG's analysis that I do not perceive, I think the Court
should consider a summary reversal.

'.

No

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

CFR with an eye toward summary reversal.

There is no response.
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Memorandum for the File
No. 83-1394, United States v. Locke, et al.
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
This is a direct appeal from the DC of Nevada that invalidated
§314 of the Federal Land Policy

Q>.<'b~ Management

Act of 1976.

The

DC found a denial of procedural due process to the extent it
authorized the voiding of a mining claim for failure to file
"on or before December 30 of each year" a notice of intention to
hold the claim.
The Facts
Appellees (members of the Locke family) acquired valid claims,
under federal law, to ten tracts of land prior to 1960.

Since that

date appellees have earned their livelihood by mining gravel.

In the

1979-80 assessment year, the value of materials mined from these
claims exceeded $1,000,000.

The claims were located on public land

belonging to the United States.
Because of inadequate records and certainty as to the existence
and ownership of unpatented mining claims in western states, the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act was adopted in 1976 that
required registration of such claims with the Bureau of Land Management.

Holders of claims wre required to register by October 21,

1979.

Appellees duly complied by registering or recording their

claims on October 19, 1979.

The statute further required that in

each clanedar year thereafter, holders of unpatented claims must
file an "assessment notice'' showing that at least $100 of labor

No. 83-1394

2.

Uc..c- ~.k..J-.~4e ~ ~~~~~. ~.)~

had been
provides

pe~ormed
tha~"the

during the year.

The statute explicitly

~

failure to file such an instrument ... shall

be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of mining
claim ... by the owner".

This §314(c) of the Act is implemented

by regulations to the same effect.
Appellees, due to a misunderstanding and thinking that this
annual report could be filed on or before December 31 of the year,
hand-delivered the report or notice on December 31.

This failed

to comply with the statutory language of "on or before December
30".
Appellees were notified that this failure constituted a
conclusive abandonment of their ten claims.
administrative appeal or review.

The Act provides for

Appellees went first to the

Department of Interior, and wre advised that their claims "are
hereby declared abandoned and void".
22(a).

See Jurisdictional Statement

Appellee then appealed to the Board of Land Appeals, and

again received an adverse decision.

The ALJ ruled that the Board

had "no authority to excuse lack of compliance" with the statute.
With respect to appellees' due process claim, the ALJ held there
was no denial of due process "so long as the individual is given
notice (of the abandonment) and an opportunity to be heard
before the decision becomes final". p. 20A
Decision of the DC
This suit was instituted challenging the consitutionality of
section 314 onthe ground that appellees' property was taken without
due process of law.

The DC, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline,

412 U.S. 441 (1973), held that the statute created an unlawful

No. 83-1394

2.

Uc..c.- ~ ..t< J-~4e
had been

pe~ormed

during the year.

,

,&').(..

vv ~ ~. ~.) ~

The statute explicitly

~

provides tha-t)"the failure to file such an instrument ... shall
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of mining
claim ... by the owner".

This §314(c) of the Act is implemented

by regulations to the same effect.
Appellees, due to a misunderstanding and thinking that this
annual report could be filed on or before December 31 of the year,
hand-delivered the report or notice on December 31.

This failed

to comply with the statutory language of "on or before December
30".
Appellees were notified that this failure constituted a
conclusive abandonment of their ten claims.
administrative appeal or review.

The Act provides for

Appellees went first to the

Department of Interior, and wre advised that their claims "are
hereby declared abandoned and void".
22(a).

See Jurisdictional Statement

Appellee then appealed to the Board of Land Appeals, and

again received an adverse decision.

The ALJ ruled that the Board

had "no authority to excuse lack of compliance" with the statute.
With respect to appellees' due process claim, the ALJ held there
was no denial of due process "so long as the individual is given
notice (of the abandonment) and an opportunity to be heard
before the decision becomes final". p. 20A
Decision of the DC
This suit was instituted challenging the consitutionality of
section 314 onthe ground that appellees' property was taken without
due process of law.

The DC, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline,

412 U.S. 441 (1973), held that the statute created an unlawful

No. 83-1394

3.

irrebuttable presumption.

The DC reasoned that appellees had

a ILproperty right' ' that was "forfeited" and found to be void
without affording procedural safeguards required by due process.
The rationale of the DC's opinion is not entirely clear.

Apparently

it thought that there should have been an opportunity to rebutt the
presumption of abandonment.

This is an appealing argument in a

case like this where it is clear beyond question that appellees had
no intention to abandon claims that had provided that livelihood
for years.

The case would not be as appealing had there been a

failure to comply with the mandatory registration or recording of
claims by October 31.
I am not persuaded by the view of the ALJ that all appropriate
due process was given by the right to appeal to the Secretary of
the Interior before the abandonment became final.

The ALJ had

recognized that the Secretary had no authority "to excuse lack
of compliance" with the December 30 filing date.

The "right to

appeal" was an empty one.
Comment
The SG- concedes that appellees had a property right, a concession required by our cases.

The SG makes the obvious point

that the United States has a "paramount title" to unpatented
mining claims, but one would think that such an interest could
not be extinguished lawfully - at least under present law - without
a hearing.

I do not understand the SG to argue that Congress could

simply cancel all unpatented mining claims without providing some

No. 83-1394
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reasonable time for the holders thereof to end their mining
businesses.

In this case appellees apparently had made invest-

ments of buildings and equipment.
I have undertaken no review of our numerous procedural
due process cases.

Going back to Fuentes, Snidach, Memphis

Light, Matthews v. Eldridge, and several others, we have afforded
procedural due process where property or expectation thereof was
being taken.

I hope we can develop a sound rationale for affirming

the DC, as certainly there is injustice in this case.

Our Court

will have to be careful, however, to recognize that statutes of
limitation - and this case involves one - are widely prevalent
and legitimate.

L.F.P.

~~~~~~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 83-1394

Dan

United States v. Locke
(CU~I-fL ~Be..
~~ October 30, 1984

~'-~?~~+)

Question Presented

Whether §314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43

u.s.c.

§1744, violates due process

by providing that a failure to file a timely notice of intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual as-

sessment work shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the claim.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background.
Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43

u.s.c.

§1744, provides:

"(a) Filing Requirements
The owner of an unpatented load or placer
mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976,
shall, within the three-year period following
October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of each
year thereafter, file the 1nstruments required by
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.

* * *
(1) File for record in the office where the
location notice or certificate is recorded either
a notice of intention to hold the mining claim
... , [or] an affidavit of assessment work performed thereon
(2)
File
in the office of the Bureau
designiated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed
lands on the ground.

***
(c)
Failure to file as constituting abandonment;
defective or untimely filing
The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section
shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the mining c!a"1.m •••• ,,

------

·-,· .. "'t •.

·.

The regs make the filing date and the consequences
for missing it even clearer.

43 C.F.R. §§3833.2-l(b) (1)

&

3833.4.

B. Factual Background.

Appees own ten unpatented mining claims on United
States government lands from which they produce gravel and
building materials.

Since 1960 they have produced approxi-

mately $4,000,000 in materials.
enacted

u.s.c.

the

Federal

Land

In 1976, the United States

Policy

and

Management

Act,

43

§§1701-1782 ("FLPMA"), which required all holders of

unpatented claims to register them with the Bureau of Land ~
Management
with this

(BLM)

by Oct.

21, 1979.

initial requirement.

Appees fully complied

Each calandar year there-

after, FLPMA further requires the filing "prior to December
31"

of

---

an

assessment notice

~

(showing

that

I-s~
~

$100 worth of /Jt-6 ~

labor has been performed on the claim during the assessment
year)

or

u.s.c.

a

notice of

intention

to retain

the claim.

43

§1744(a).
In an effort to comply with this provision, appees

______......,_

sent their daughter to the Reno BLM office to inquire about
the procedures.

According to her uncontradicted affidavit,

~she was told that the documents should be filed at the Reno ~

BLM office "on or before December 31, 1980," not "prior to
Dec.

31" as the statute and the regs require.

Appees then

hand-delivered the documents to the Reno office on December

On April 4,

31, 1980.

1981,

appees received notice that

-

their mining claims were "abandoned and void" for failure
to file "on or before December 30."

They appealed the dec-

laration of abandonment to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
appees'
claims.

(IBLA).
failure

That
to

body

file

a

ruled
timely

on

June

notice

25,

1982

forfeited

that
their

The IBLA refused to address appees constitutional

arguments and so they filed this action in D.Nev. to chal- ~/-
lenge

the

constitutionality

of

43

u.s.c.

----------------------------------claimed it deprived them of procedural due

§1744.
process

Th~

CZc:..~q
under J7 t.,

the Fifth Amendment.

v

The DC

(Thompson, J.),

relying on prior cases of

this Court discussing mining claims,
terest

warranting

found a property in- ~.

due

It

then

held

~~

that under this Court's line of "irrebuttable presumption"
cases,

~,

Vlandis v. Kline, 412

v. Illinois, 405

u.s.

u.s.

441 (1973); Stanley

645 (1972), the procedural safeguards

given to miners under the FLPMA were constitutionally inadequate.

It read Vlandis as creating a two-prong test: "If

the presumption is not necessarily or universally true in
fact and the government has available reasonable alternative means of making

the crucial determination,

then due

process demands a hearing to rebut the presumption."
to J.S.

Sa.

App.

The present case, it found, demonstrated that

the presumption was not "necessarily or universally true in

determina~~:
more accurate. ~~

fact, • and the DC also believed that individual
tions at hearings would be both feasible and

Accordingly,

it

held

-

hearings

that

-

--~+------------------

constitutionally required.

.__

were

~~~~QQ~n

the statute

""

as applied to resps on the ground that the legislative history indicated that the purpose of the FLPMA was to "maintain a current index of non-patented claims merely for the
convenience of federal land managers."
purpose

to

BLM had

to accept

Since there was no

long-dormant claims,"

"clear

it held,

substantial compliance with

the

its filing

requirements.

II. Discussion

Since this Court has held that unpatented mining
~

claims constitute a possessory interest in land as well as

~b~~k·
~~

~-

"property

.
1n

the

fullest

sense of

that

term," ~
W1l b ur

v•

. ~f
United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 317 ( 1930) ,
;wv""" .
~
~~~ the government cannot argue that the FLPMA simply redefines
~~~f . -

the underlying property interest to make it contingent on
yearly filings.
mind,

amount

Such a radical redefinition would,

to an uncompensated

to my

The government

taking .

.---?

~ ~

~~

{ can

regain

means:

a

mining

~nd

~_,);t ~ aimholder 's

claim

without

forfeiture

"subjective

payment

through

two

Abandonment consists of

intent

to

abandon

coupled

~~ with an external and objective act by which that intent is

~6-~?
~ ~

-v
~

carried

into effect."

---

Forfeiture,

~ claimholder 's

on

the

2 Am.

other

Law of Mining
hand,

§ 8 •1A

consists

( 19 8 3 ) •
of

the

failure to fulfill some condition upon which

~c:_

the

claim was originally conditioned,

assessment work on the property.
filing

requirements were

such as continuing

Id., at §8.7C.

imposed after

Since the

the appees gained

their interest, the government cannot argue that failure to

-

file

properly

amounted

to a

The

forfeiture.

filing

re-

quirements must be judged according to whether they reason-

ably indicate whether an actual abandonment occurred
In

Texaco,

Inc.

v.

Short,

516 _)1982),

this Court considered the constitutionality of an Indiana
statute which provided that a severed mineral interest that
is not used for

20 years automatically lapses and reverts

to

owner of

the

owner

surface
files

the property unless

the mineral

a statement of claim in the local county re-

corder's office.

The "use" of a mineral interest that was

sufficient to preclude its extinction included the actual
or attempted production of minerals,

the payment of rents

or royalties, and any payment of taxes.

The Court upheld

the statute on the ground that "the State has the power to
condition the permanent retention of [a) property right on
the

performance of

present

intention

(emphasis added).

reasonable conditions
to

retain

the

that

interest."

indicate a
Id.,

at

526

The reason why such conditions pose no

due process problems is that, once a claim has been aban-

--

doned,

--

the

protect.

owner

retains

no

interest

for

due process

to

Thus, requiring the performance of certain condi-

tions is constitutionally permissible so long as those condi tions

are

reasonable

in

themselves

and

not

performing

/

~

them can

reasonably be

seen as evidence of

an

intent to

abandon or at least of lack of intent to retain.
The Texaco test thus has two prongs:

( i)

are the

conditions reasonable ones to expect claimholders to perform and (ii) do the conditions provide reasonably reliable
indicia
that

the

of

intent.

filing

The Court

in

requirements were

Texaco

largely

reasonable

assumed

to perform.

However, the dissent, which you joined, attacked the majority's belief that it was reasonable to assume abandonment
under the circumstances.

The majority replied:

"We do not believe • . • that the State's assumption of abandonment in these cases is improper.
[T)he length of the period that is afforded
to a mineral owner to use the interest, the variety and minimal extent of the actions that constitute a statutory use, and the length of the
statutory grace period are sufficient to entitle
the State to indulge in the assumption that--if
no statutory use is made in a 20-year period and
no statement of claim is filed ••• --the mineral
owner has abandoned the property.
We need not
decide today whether the State may indulge in a
similar assumption in cases in which the statutory period of nonuse is shorter than that involved here, or in which the interest affected is
such that concepts of 'use' or 'nonuse' have little meaning."
454 u.s., at 535 n.28 (emphasis
added) .
In reaching its decision, the Texaco Court applied
a general due

process "fairness" approach and avoided both

the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine and the Mathews v.
Eldrige calculus.
however, for

Which approach one takes matters little,

in this context the Texaco, irrebuttable pre-

sumption, and Mathews v. Eldridge approaches are all basically the same.

Insofar as is relevant here, each weighs

the reasonableness of the conditions and their reliability

as evidence of intent to abandon against the administrative
problems

that

would

be

encountered

if

particularly hearings, were required.

other

procedures,

There are two ques- r~t;;_5'

tions, then, at issue: ~ how reasonable is the statutory

d~

assumption that claims not covered by a proper yearly filing

have

been abandoned

and

@

would requiring

further

procedures ensure more accurate abandonment determinations
without creating an administrative nightmare?
fers no answers to these questions.

----

The law of-

One must turn instead

to commonsense and one's own notion of reasonableness.
.__

In the present case, the first issue presents the

question the Court left unanswered in Texaco.
in

that

case

conclusively

years of nonuse.

presumed

The statute

abandonment

after

20

Section 314, on the other hand, conclu-

sively presumes abandonment from a failure to make a proper
yearly

filing.

This

assumption

strikes

reasonable than the one in Texaco.

me

as

much

less

~

Not only is the period

~-----------~~--,----------~--

of time significantly shorter but also the claimholders in
the present case had given affirmative notice just a year
before that they intended to retain their

interest.

Per-

haps the best way of thinking about the reasonableness of

this period is to compare it to analogous adverse posses- ~
sion periods,

as

this Court did

in Texaco.

Allowing

~

adverse possessor to obtain title after only a year might
well rise to the level of a due process violation.

I would

certainly be uncomfortable about such a law.

;,,

+ r.\

.~

.,

The second question is more difficult and open to
more debate.

On the one hand, a hearing would allow a much

more accurate determination of whether a claim has actually ~~
been abandoned.

Of this there can be little doubt.

On the

other hand, holding hearings in all cases would create an
administrative

burden of

huge

proportions.

According

to

appees and some amici, the number of people who have fallen
I wonder, ~ d...D

afoul of the yearly filing requirement is great.
however,

~ Since the
7~ intent to
~~~~<
~
avoid

how

many

would

actually

be

necessary.

BLM now accepts a yearly filing as evidence of
retain an interest in a claim, it could largely

hearings

dures

hearings

9

based

by

on

instituting
similar

appropriate

evidence.

proce- -/A~Sl!!iii!!!l--'1411.
1 ._
1 ....,

summary

Requiring

a

hearing

could, in fact, mean only that the claimholders would have
to get a second notice informing them of their right to a
hearing.

If

they

did

not

respond,

the

government

could

terminate their interest without a hearing on the basis of
little evidence.

Perhaps failure to respond to the notice

could be enough evidence by itself.

If a claimholder did

ask for a hearing, the BLM could either hold one if it felt
a claim had been actually abandoned or, if not, treat the
request itself as evidence of intent to retain the possessory interest.
To judge the fairness and practicality of such a
system,

we

must

consider

claimholders who miss
-----------~

_

four

different

the
__............ yearly deadline:

classes
(i)

of

those who

have actually abandoned their claims but ask for a hearing,

..

.'

(ii)

those who have abandoned their claims and do not ask

for one,

(iii)

those who have not actually abandoned their

claims and ask for a hearing, and
abandoned

(iv)

those who have not

their claims and do not ask for one.

categories

(ii)

and

(iv)

Those in

would forfeit their interests but

only after receiving an opportunity for a hearing.
failure

to

Those,

take

advantage

like appees,

of

it

in category

interest without going

creates
(iii)

through a

no

Their

unfairness.

could retain their

full hearing unless the

BLM had some legitimate doubt as to abandonment.

In most

cases, the BLM could use summary procedures to hold against
abandonment on the basis of some showing of continuing intent to possess.

Those in category

(i)

pose the problem,

for the government could not disposses them of their claim
without

holding

a

full

hearing.

The

only

question

is

whether the increased certainty that the procedure adds to
all determinations is worth the cost in this one category.
I believe it is, but reasonable men could well differ.
Appees make the final argument that even if there
is no due process problem with the §314 presumption, substantial compliance should be accepted.
non-starter

for

§314 is clear.

several

reasons.

It requires filing

This argument is a

First,

the

language

of

"prior to December 31"

of each year, not filing on or a reasonable time after that
date.

Allowing substantial compliance here would cast into

doubt the absoluteness of most statutory time requirements.
Furthermore, the regs promulgated pursuant to §314 make the

..

,

strictness of the deadline clear:

"The failure to file an

instrument required by §§3833.1-2(a), and 3833.2-1 of this
title within the time periods prescribed therein, shall be
deemed

conclusively

mining

and

claim

§3833.4(a).

to

constitute
it

shall

an

abandonment

be

void."

of

43

the

C.F.R.

Nothing suggests that this reg is invalid.

III. Conclusion.

Since

an

unpatented

mining

claim constitutes

an

ordinary possessory interest in land, the government cannot
regain that interest without paying compensation
the claimholder has abandoned or forfeited
is no question of forfeiture here.
whether

presuming

<----

--

abandonment

from

to

the

And there

The question, then, is
a

failure

timely yearly filing violates due process.
according

it.

~ss

to

make

a

Whether judged

the general procedural due process approach

this Court employed

in Texaco,

its "irrebuttable presump-

tion" analysis, or the Mathews v. Eldridge due process calculus,

the answer depends on the same two issues

failure to make

a~ ly ~ arly

an intent to

aban~n~ould
1\1

accurately

determine

impracticable?

a

filing reasonably evidence
alternative procedures more
intent

without

being

I believe the answer to the first question

is "no."

One year

which

base

to

this

~oes

such

is just too short a period of time on
an

assumption,

especially

claimholders have affirmatively indicated their

since

the

intent to

retain the interest only a year before in their last yearly
filing.

I

believe

the

ans-wer

to

the

second question

is

"yes." Although the specter of hearings in every case cer'---....
tainly presents an administrative nightmare, in practice
very few hearings would need

to be held.

would find a violation of due process.

Accordingly,

I

~: ~~4'r-t

It is important to realize how much of the statutory scheme such a holding would affect.

First,

it would

not affect BLM findings that those claimholders who failed
to make a proper initial filing within the three-year grace
period allowed by the statute abandoned their claims.
initial

requirement

not

-

This

only is not questioned in the
-----~--------------~
present case but also is different in several respects: (i)
its three-year period is more reasonable:
make a proper

initial filing

( i i)

failure

to

is not preceded only a year

before by any affirmative showing of an

intent to retain

possession: and (iii) the government's interest in removing
cloud

on

these

stale

claims

is

stronger.

Second ,

this

holding would not affect mining claims located after enactment of the FLPMA.

Since Congress can always condition new

grants on whatever requirements it wishes, failure to make
proper yearly filings as to these would constitute a valid
forfeiture.
for

Abandonment would not even be an issue.

these two reasons,

Thus,

the sweep of the holding I propose

would be somewhat limited.

IV. Recommendation

I recommend affirming the judgment of the DC .

..

~

f.

~~
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November 15, 1984

83-1394 United States v. Locke

Dear John:
As you and I voted to affirm in this case, I would
appreciate vour writing a dissent along the lines that persuaded me to agree with you.
As you know, I also think there is a serious procedural due process issue - a view that Sandra shares. Her
vote, however, was tentatively to reverse. If she should
conclude to write on the due process issue and affirm on
that basis, I may also join her or say that if it were necessary to reach the constitutional issue I would agree. I
do not think, however, that it is necessary to make a constitutional decision.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice O'Connor

T'

j;npunu <lJo-url o-f tlf~ 'Jt{nit~lt j;tat~g

._aglfingron. ~. <lJ.

21lbT'1~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 15, 1984

Re:

83-1394 - United States v. Locke

Dear Lewis:
I will be happy to prepare a dissent on the
statutory question.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
cc:

.,. ••

...

10,

Justice O'Connor

..iuprtmt Qfttttrl 1tf tlrt ~tb .,iWtg
._asfti:n:ghm. ~. <ij. 211~~~
CHAMI3ER S O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 25, 1985

Re: No. 83-1394

United States

v. Locke

Dear Thurgood,
I agree with most of your op1n1on and of course with the
result, but I do not agree with the manner in which you have
treated our "irrebuttable presumption" cases in your
footnote 16, and I have some reservation about the sweep of
your footnote 12 discussing the rather complicated subject
of p~o~~ t~ _~i~. I will probably write separately on
the'S'e"po~ -

Sincerely,

~

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference

·'

'

'

.tn.prtutt Q}ourt ltf l4t ~ittb .ttalt.e'
Jlu-lfinglon, Jl. (!}. 21l?ll~
CHAMBE:RS Of'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

/

January 25, 1985

re:

83-1394

United States et al. v. Madison D. Locke, et al.

Dear Thurgood,
For the present I will await further writing
in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.hJn"tmt <qourt .n tlft ~a .itatt•
-u~ J).

<q.

21l?'l'

CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 28, 1985

Re: No. 83-1394 - United States v. Locke
Dear Thurgood:
Would you consider eliminating footnote 16 on page 21? If
you see your way clear to make this change, you have my joinder.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

,,

..uprenu

O+Oltrl Df tlf.t ~trit ..tatts

'Jfulfittghm. ~.

"+·

2ll~'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 28, 1985

Re:

83-1394 - United States v. Locke

Dear Thurgood:
As soon as I can get to it I will try my hand at
a dissent.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

h.

To: The Chief Justice ; / J_ _/1)
Justice Brennan ~ 't ~UJustice White
·
·
Justice Blackmun
ustice Powell
ustice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

•.

From:

·

Justice Marshall

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _
J_A_N_2_9_19_8_5__

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1394

UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MADISON
D. LOCKE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA
[January-, 1985]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether
the Constitution prevents Congress from providing that holders of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall
forfeit their claims.
I
From the enactment of the general mining laws in the nineteenth century until1976, those who sought to make their living by locating and developing minerals on federal lands were
virtually unconstrained by the fetters of federal control.
The general mining laws, 30 U.S. C. §22 et seq., still in
effect today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop
certain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed
by the minimal procedures required to formally "locate" the
deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession
of the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as
$100 of assessment work is performed ann ly, the individual may continue to extract and sell mi als from the claim
without paying any royalty to the Uni d States, 30 U. S. C.
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and afte certain statutory conditions are fulfilled, an individu may patent the claim,
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thereby purchasing from the federal government the land
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patenting, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963).
By the 1960s, it had become clear that this nineteenth century laissez faire regime had created virtual chaos with respect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that
more than six million unpatented mining claims existed on
public lands other than the national forests; in addition, more
than half the land in the National Forest System was thought
to be covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65
(1975). Many of these claims had been dormant for decades,
and many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence
of a federal recording system, no simple way existed for
determining which public lands were subject to mining locations, and whether those locations were valid or invalid.
Ibid. As a result, federal land managers had to proceed
slowly and cautiously in taking any action affecting federal
land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) proposed a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a
title search in the county recorder's office was necessary; if
an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale
or apparently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication
was required to determine the validity of the claim. 1
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the
context of a broader inquiry into the proper management of
the public lands in the modern era, Congress in 1976 enacted
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No.
94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1784).
Section 314 of the Act establishes a federal recording system
that is designed both to rid federal lands of stale mining
claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date
See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219.
1
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information that allows them to make informed and expeditious land management decisions. For claims located before FLPMA's enactment, 2 the federal recording system
imposes two requirements. First, the claims must initially
be recorded with the BLM by filing, within three years of
FLPMA's enactment, a copy of the official record of the
notice or certificate of location. 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(b); 43
U. S. C. § 1744(b). Second, every year after the initial recording, and "prior to December 31," the claimant must file
with BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim. 90 Stat.
2743, §314(a); 43 U.S. C. §1744(a). Section 314(c) of the
Act provides that failure to comply with either of these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the mining claim . .. by the owner." 43
U. S. C. § 1744(c).
The second of these requirements-the annual filing obligation-has created the dispute underlying this appeal.
Appellees, four individuals "engaged in the business of
operating mining properties in Nevada,'' 3 purchased in 1960
and 1966 ten unpatented mining claims on public lands near
Ely, Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel
and building material: the claims are valued at several million
dollars, 4 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appellees' gross income totalled more than one million dollars. 5
Throughout the period during which they owned the claims,
appellees complied with annual state law filing and assessment work requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied
FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing
2
A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October
21, 1976, the date the Act was passed.
8
Plaintiff's Complaint 112.
• Plaintiff's Complaint 1115.
5
Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to
1980, total gross income from the claims exceeded four million dollars.

Ibid.
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with BLM a notice of location, thereby putting their claims
on record for purposes of FLPMA.
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on
time their first annual FLPMA filing obligation, for appellees
waited until December 31 to submit to BLM the annual notice
of intent to hold or proof of assessment work performed required under section 314(a) ofFLPMA, 43 U. S. C.§ 1744(a).
As noted above, that section requires these documents to be
filed annually "prior to December 31." Had appellees
checked, they would further have discovered that BLM regulations made quite clear that claimants were required to
make the annual filings in the proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calender year." 43 CFR § 3833.21(a) (1980) (current version at 43 CFR 3833.2-1(b)(1). Thus,
appellees' filing was one day too late.
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when
they received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office informing them that their claims had been declared abandoned
and void due to the failure to file, prior to December 31, 1980,
a notice of intent to hold or an affidavit of assessment work
performed. In many cases, loss of a claim in this way would
have minimal practical effect; the claimant could simply
locate the same claim again and then rerecord it with BLM.
In this case, however, relocation of appellees' claims, which
were initially located by appellees' predecessors in 1952 and
1954, was prohibited by the Common Varieties Act of 1955,
30 U. S. C. § 611; that Act prospectively barred location of
the sort of minerals yielded by appellees' claims. Appellees'
mineral deposits thus escheated to the Government.
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the
present action in the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that
§ 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property
without just compensation and denied them due process. On
summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) did
indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they were
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constitutionally due. The District Court reasoned that
§ 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption
that claimants who failed to make a timely filing intended to
abandon their claims. Rather than relying on this presumption, the Government was obliged, in the District Court's
view, to provide individualized notice to claimants that their
claims were in danger of being lost, followed by a post-filing
deadline hearing at which the claimants could demonstrate
that they had not, in fact, abandoned a claim. Alternatively,
the District Court held that the one-day late filing "substantially complied" with the Act and regulations.
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress unconstitutional in a civil suit to which the United States was
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252. - - U. S. - - (1984). 6 We now reverse.
II
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27 n. 7 (1960).
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court.
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1979). 7 These
That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court.
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939).
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared section 314(c)
unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to
meet the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion.
Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982).
7
When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instructions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S.
6
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principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S. - - , - (1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974);
cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal Appeals Act); see generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(1936). Thus, we turn first to the nonconstitutional questions pressed below.
III
A
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the section 314(a) requirement of a filing "prior to December 31 of
each year" should be construed to require a filing "on or before December 31." Thus, appellees argued, their December 31 filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the
BLM had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims.
Although the District Court did not address this argument,
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra.
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even
appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) "is a statement
that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th. I think
that is a clear statement ... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23
(1979). The choice between these options depends on the extent to which
lower court factfinding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will
be necessary or useful to our disposition of those questions.
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id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would require a
December 30th filing . . . ."). While we will not allow
literal reading of a statute to produce a result "demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), with respect to
filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those words. To attempt to
decide whether some date other than the one set out in the
statute is the date actually "intended" by Congress is to set
sail on an aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline
would be just as well served by nearly any date a court might
choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in the statute. "Actual purpose is sometimes unknown," U. S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (STEVENS, J., concurring), and such is the case with filing
deadlines; as might be expected, nothing in the legislative
history suggests why Congress chose December 30 over
December 31, or over September 1 (the end of the assessment year for mining claims, 30 U. S. C. § 28), as the last day
on which the required filings could be made. But "[d]eadlines are inherently arbitrary," while fixed dates "are often
essential to accomplish necessary results." United States v.
Boyle,- U.S.--,- (1984). Faced with the inherent arbitrariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in a
civil case, apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute.
Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449
u. s. 166, 179 (1980). 8

a

8
Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle, U. S. - , (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit
provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonable cause
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Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31"
means what it says. As the current version of the filing
regulations states:
The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on
Federal lands ... shall have filed or caused to have been
filed on or before December 30 of each calendar year . . .
evidence of annual assessment work performed during
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to
hold the mining claim. 43 CFR § 3833.2-1.
See also 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR
3833.2-1(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1 (a) (1980) (same);
43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1)
(1978) ("prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1977)
("prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly inform claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing of
a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must be
done prior to December 31 of each year, i. e, on or before
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining§ 7.23D, at 150.2
(1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, who
were businessmen involved in the running of a major mining
operation for more than 20 years, had any questions about
whether a December 31 filing complied with the statute, it
was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other businessmen,
see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the regulations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice.
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission
of a last-minute filing, would surely have led appellees to the
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they
could file safely.
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed
by congressional reliance on the words "prior to December
exception to the Code's filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no analogous provision.
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31;" in the absence of agency regulations, the congressional
language might well have become an unintended trap for the
unwary who, upon a cursory reading of the statute, could
have been misled into thinking that the filing must simply be
made by the end of the year. But the agency regulations
clarify and confirm the import of the statutory language by
making clear that the annual filings must be made on or before December 30. These regulations provide a conclusive
answer to appellees' claim, for where the language of a filing
deadline is plain and the agency's construction completely
consistent with that language, the agency's construction simply cannot be found "sufficiently unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981).
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of disingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question.
Moore Ice Cream v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1932) (Cardozo, J.). 9 We therefore hold that BLM did not act ultra
vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely.
B
Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing
requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim."
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a
9
We note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 15 provisions that
contemplate action "prior to December 31," and it would be disingenuous
indeed to hold that Congress meant all of these provisions, or some eclectic
n " rior to." See 7 U. S.
selection of them, to read "on" rather
§609(b)(5); 12 u.s. c. § 170 . 12 u.s. c. § 1823(g); 12 u.s. c.
§ 1841(a)(5)(A); ?UJ. S. C. § 37 (c); 26 U. S. C. § 503 (d)(1); 33 U. S. C.
§1319(a)(5)(B); 42 U.S. C. §415(a)(1)(c)(ii); 42 U.S. C. §1692-17(b); 42
U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2); 43
U.S. C. § 1744(a); 50 U. S.C, App. §41; 50 U.S. C., App. § 1741. In
addition, Congress knows how to make explicit an intent to allow action on
December 31 when it employs a December 31 date in a statute. See, e. g.,
7 u. s. c. § 609(b)(2); 22 u. s. c. § 3303; 43 u. s. c. § 256.
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congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings
have not been made and for which the claimants have a specific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District
Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss
of a claim turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior
hearing and findings on the claimant's intent were constitutionally required before the claim of a non-filing claimant
could be extinguished.
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the specific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed
to make the required filings, the District Court began from
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of
mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "abandonment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of
law must be shown. See, e. g., 2 American Law of Mining
§ 8.2, at 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court).
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute
any intent to depart from the term-of-art meaning of "abandonment" at common law, the District Court concluded that
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional commonlaw distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus,
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual intent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the failure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a
specific intent to abandon his property.
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This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1, 59 (1910), this principle is a guide to legislative intent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be applied
in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and logic. Although § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive presumption of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that Congress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims for
which the filing requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) had not
been met.
To begin with, the Senate version of§ 314(c) provided that
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., - - Cong. Rec. S2371 (Feb. 25, 1976). 10
The Committee Report accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indicated that failure to comply with the filing requirements
would make a claim "void." SeeS. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65,
66 (1975). The House legislation and reports merely repeat
the statutory language without offering any explanation of it,
but it is clear from the Conference Committee Report that
the undisputed intent of the Senate-to make "void" those
claims for which proper filings were not timely made-was
the intent of both chambers. The Report stated: "Both the
Senate bill and House amendments provided for recordation
of mining claims and for extinguishment of abandonded
claims." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62
(1976) (emphasis added).
10
The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Committee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal
law required.

·'
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In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give
effect to the "conclusive presumption" language of § 314(c).
If the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant
to prove that he intends to keep the claim, then nothing "conclusive" is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought
to avoid this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extinguish automatically those claims for which initial recordings,
as opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial recordings and annual filings on the ground that the dominant
purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the "awesome task of searching every local title record" to establish
initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp. 472, 477,
(D. Nev. 1983). Once this purpose had been satisfied by an
initial recording, the primary purposes of the conclusive presumption, in the District Court's view, had been met. But
the clear language of§ 314(c) admits of no distinction between
initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either "shall
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment."
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of§ 314(c) is
also misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement;
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to
keep the system established in § 314 up to date on a yearly
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system current through its own inquiry into the status of recorded
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led Congress initially to make the federal recording system selfexecuting. The purposes of a self-executing recording system are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially,
by the annual filing obligation as by the initial recording
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only initial recordings.

83-1394-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

13

For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time,
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 619, 628 (CA9 1981).

c
A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying
primarily on Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., 400 U. S. 48 (1970), the
District Court held that, even if the statute required a filing
on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially complied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept this view
of the statute.
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the
least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting
principle. If one-day late filings are acceptable, ten-day late
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to the individuals who
fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a
lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle,
- - U. S. - - , (1984). A filing deadline cannot be
complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing lateeven by one day.
Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., supra, does not support a contrary
conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not hold, that
failure to meet the annual assessment work requirements of
the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §28, which require that

l
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"not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or
improvements made during each year," would not render a
claim automatically void. Instead, if an individual complied
substantially but not fully with the requirement, he might
under some circumstances be able to retain possession of his
claim.
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be performed each year is significantly different from the complete
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for failure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress
had intended to make the assessment work requirement
merely an indicia of a claimant's specific intent to retain a
claim. Full compliance with the assessment work requirements would establish conclusively an intent to keep the
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a caseby-case determination of whether he nonetheless intended to
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57.
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads automatically to loss of the claim. See supra Part liB. Thus,
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indicative of the claimant's intent-intent is simply irrelevant if the
required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of substantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory
scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners no
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greater latitude with filing deadlines than have other
individuals. 11
IV
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion,
predicated as it was on the view that § 314(c) is concerned
with the claimant's actual intent, necessarily falls with our
conclusion that § 314(c) automatically deems forfeited those
claims for which the required filings are not timely made.
Nonetheless, there are suggestions in the District Court's
opinion that, even understood as a forfeiture provision,
§ 314(c) might be unconstitutional. We therefore go on to
consider whether automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to
make annual filings is constitutionally permissible. The
framework for analysis of this question, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions, is set forth by our recent
decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982).
There we upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed
mineral interest that had not been used for a period of 20
years automatically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of the property, unless the mineral owner filed a
statement of claim in the county recorder's office within two
years of the statute's passage.
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of affirmative legislative power: whether Congress is authorized
to "provide that property rights of this character shall be
extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative acSince 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the following January 19th. 43 CFR 3833. 0-5(m) (1983). Appellees view this regulation as validating "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements.
Even had this regulation been in effect at the time appellees filed in 1980,
we would not be able to agree with appellees' view; that an agency has
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not in any way suggest that the agency has adopted a general policy of waiving the statutory
filing requirements.
11
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tion required by the" statute. I d., at 516. As a matter of
federal law, an unpatented mining claim properly discovered
and located on federal land is, of course, "property in the
fullest sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306, 317 (1930); see also Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335-336 (1963); Cameron v.
United States, 252 U. S. 450, 460-461 (1920). Nonetheless,
legislatures clearly have the power to impose new regulatory
constraints on the way in which existing property rights are
used, or to condition continued retention of an existing property right on the performance of certain affirmative duties,
as long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further legitimate legislative objectives.
See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U. S. 365
(1926); Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, 94 (1897); Vance v.
Vance 108 U. S. 514, 517 (1883); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
628 (1877). "[L]egislation adjusting rights and burdens is
not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S.
1, 15-16 (1976) (citations omitted).
In this case, there can be no doubt that Congress, acting
pursuant to its broad regulatory powers over the use and
occupancy of the public lands, see, e. g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976), could condition initial receipt of
an unpatented mining claim upon an agreement to perform
annual assessment work and make annual filings. That this
requirement was applied to claims already located by the
time FLPMA was enacted, and thus might, in some sense, be
viewed as retroactive, does not alter the analysis, for any
"retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means .... "
U. S. (1984). The
PBSC v. R. A. Gray & Co., purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to claims
located before the Act was passed-to rid federal lands of
stale mining claims and to provide for centralized collection
by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-to-date in-
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fonnation on the status of recorded but unpatented mining
claims-are clearly legitimate. In addition, § 314(c) is a reasonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of their claims those claimants who fail to file
provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing requirements, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance
enables federal land managers to know with certainty and
ease whether a claim is currently valid. Finally, the restriction attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must
simply file a paper once a year indicating that the required
assessment work has been perfonned or that they intend to
hold the claim. 12 As a result, Congress was well within its
12
Appellees suggest that Texaco further requires that the restriction
imposed be substantively reasonable in the sense that it adequately relate
to some common law conception of the nature of the property right involved. Thus, appellees point to the fact that, in Texaco, failure to file
could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition, the mineral interest had lain
dormant for 20 years; according to appellees, conjunction of a 20-year dormancy period with failure to file a statement of claim sufficiently indicated
abandonment, as that term is understood at common law, to justify the
statute.
Appellees misperceive the nature of property in our modem cases. In
the regulation of private property rights, the legislature's substantive
power is not constrained by the brooding omnipresence of common-law
conceptions regarding the "inherent" nature or scope of the property right
involved. Compare Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 21 (1915) with
Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 187 (1941) (overruling Coppage);
see also Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467 ("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his rights or property? It is clear
that the subject is one over which every community is at liberty to make a
rule for itself"). Instead, property rights are defined by the reasonable
expectations an individual legitimately holds with regard to the extent to
which legislative action will alter his right. Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York, 438 U. S. 104, 125 (1978). Because legislation by its
very function alters the status quo, it is unreasonable to expect that, once a
property right is obtained, its use will never be qualified by subsequent
legislative action; "in the interest of the community, [government may]
limit one [right] that others may be enjoyed." Walls v. Midland Carbon
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affirmative powers in enacting the filing requirements, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment set forth in§ 314(c), and
in applying the requirements and sanction to claims located
before FLPMA was passed.
Second, we look to the substantive effect of§ 314(c) to determine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting it as a result of the intrusion it works on some constitutionally protected right. With respect to the regulation of
private property, any such protection must come from the
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private
property without just compensation. On this point, however, Texaco is controlling: "this Court has never required
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law.
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file-apd not the
action of Congress-that caused the property right to be
extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take"
private property when an individual's reasonable, investCo., 254 U. S. 300, 315 (1920). The limitations on the legislature's power
to act for the public welfare by conditioning continued retention of property on the performance of newly imposed duties are essentially twofold:
first, the burden imposed by the regulation cannot be so unreasonable that
it "force[s] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); second, the individual must have
notice of the newly-imposed requirements of the law and a "reasonable
opportunity" to conform his conduct to those requirements. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1924). In this case, Congress has chosen to redefine the way in which a mining claim can be lost
through imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objectives, imposes the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes
effect only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply
and a reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets
these standards is sufficient, under Texaco, to make it a reasonable restriction on the continued retention of the property right.
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ment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long
as he complies with the regulatory restrictions the legislature
has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272,
279-280; Terry v. Anderson, supra, 95 U. S., at 632-633; cf.
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457. 466 ("What right has
any one to complain, when a reasonable time has been given
him, if he has not been vigilant in asserting his rights?").
Third, the Act provides appellees with all the process that
is their constitutional due. In altering substantive rights
through the enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate process
simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to
familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454
U. S., at 532; see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett,
321 U. S. 233, 243 (1944); North Laramie Land Co. v. Horrman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt
that the Act's recording provisions meet these minimal requirements. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners
of existing claims, such as appellees, were not required to
make an initial recording until October 1979. This threeyear period, during which individuals could become familiar
with the requirements of the new law, surpasses the twoyear grace period we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of mineral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific
annual filing obligation at issue in this case is not triggered
until the year after which the claim is recorded initially; thus,
every claimant in appellees' position already has filed once
before the annual filing obligations come due, and the very
fact that these claimants already have made one filing under
the Act indicates that they know, or must be presumed to
know, of the existence of the Act and of their need to inquire
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into its demands. 13 The requirement of an annual filing thus
was not so unlikely to come to the attention of those in the
position of appellees as to render unconstitutional the notice
provided by the three-year grace period. 14
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards
laid down in Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court
seemed to believe that individualized notice of the filing deadlines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The District Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great benefit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a
sound means of administering the Act. 15 But in the regulation of private property rights, the Constitution offers the
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative
routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to say
that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a national
13

As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in character, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average citizen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a
heightened awareness of one's legal obligations." Texaco, 454 U. S., at
547 (BRENNAN, J. , dissenting).
14
BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for
failure to make a timely filing.
10
In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last several years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several
months before the end of the year; according to the Government, these
notices state that "you must file on or before 12130 [of the relevant year.]
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22.
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recording system] rationally; whether a [different notice
scheme] would have been wiser or more practical under the
circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension."
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S. 1, 19 (1975).
Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place
a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the
national recording system work. See Ibid; Weinberger v. l
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The District Court
therefore erred in invoking the Constitution to supplant the
valid administrative scheme established by Congress. For
that reason, the judgment below is_!_everse9J and the case remanded for further proceedings coliSiSteritWith this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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LOCKED SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Dan

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 13, 1985

83-1394 United States v. Locke
I like your draft dissent of March 12.
I

find

it

quite

persuasive.

I

make

the

Indeed,
following

comments:
As

1.

I

requested

JPS

to

write

the

dissent,

could I fairly say at the outset that I agree with much of
his

dissent?

stronger
position

I

reason
is

that

write
for
it

separately

disagreeing

because

with

is fundamentally

the

unfair

I

think

a

government's
in fact

and

also in a constitutional sense.
2.

Although

the opinion of the other Justices

state the facts and identify the forfeiture, I think it is
important at the outset of our dissent to restate briefly
the setting of this case.

As now written, the dissent is

impersonal, and cannot be easily understood in the absence
of the factual s i taut ion.

Perhaps a brief summary could

be included in the text, with the more essential details
placed in footnotes.

2.

Here

we

have

a

claimant

who

mining claim successfully for years.
"stale

claim".

Your

draft

does

has

worked

his

In no sense is it a

state

that

the

claim

holders had filed the basic information prior to October
21,

197 6,

but

the

seriousness of

the

forfeiture

is not

clear.
3.
standing",

Perhaps

also,

to

make

our

dissent

"free-

it would be helpful to add footnotes wherever

they may enlighten a reader who has not read any opinion
other

than ours.

This would require,

perhaps,

a

little

fuller exposition in footnotes of the government's policy
that for many years encouraged mining claim holders to do
exactly

what

the

Lockes

did

in

this

case:

develop

property values that lay dormant and unused.

may

not

opinions.

4.

Use in the draft of the term "retroactively"

be

self

evident

unless

one

reads

the

other

A note could explain this.
5.

We

also

should make clear

in a

note

that

ordinarily parties are bound to the precise date specified
in

a

statute

duties
unique,

or

of

the

however

limitations or
filing
for

of
the

other
reasons

the

imposition of other

claims.

This

summarized

by

case

is

Justice

•.

3.

Stevens' opinion (your page 3), plus the other reasons set
forth in your draft.
On
circumstances,
itself

page

3,

you

refer

considered

summarizing

the

to

JPS's

regulations

statutory

list

that

deadline

of

the

"BLM

confusing".

-erhaps a citation to the regulation would be appropriate.
when

was

the

pamphlet

issued

that

reinterpreted the filing date to be "on or before December

31"?

Some

of

these

suggestions,

Dan,

may

unnecessary in light of what others have written.
not have their opinions before me.

be
I

do

My basic thought

is

that other Justices may be more inclined to join us if our
opinion

could

be

read

separately

with

a

firmer

understanding of what the government has done to the Locke
family in this case for no good purpose, and in a state of
confusion
process

that

requires

the

government

notice

opportunity to be heard.

that

itself
is

clear

recognizes.
as

well

Due
as

an

It is not easy to believe that,

in all of the circumstances, the notice of this forfeiture
of a property interest met the standard of clearness.
am

glad

you

suggested

the

desirability

of

a

I

separable

4.

-'

dissent.

In view of what the doctors have in mind for me

beginning perhaps Thursday,
changes

along

appropriate.

the

I

suggest that you make such

lines of my

suggestions

as

you

think

Then have our dissent printed and circulated

as a first draft.

Of course, have a co-clerk read it both

for substance and cite checking.
The
indeed

if

all

case
the

will
votes

not

be

coming

should

be

down

in,

ask

next week
that

it

be

carried over for another week so that I can see the final
form.

But

I

would

like

to

move

getting it circulated.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

our

dissent

along

by

lfp/ss 03/13/85
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1
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Although
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who
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Your

draft

does
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In no sense is it a

state

that

the

claim

holders had filed the basic information prior to October
21,

197 6,

but

the

seriousness of

the

forfeiture

is not

clear.
3.
standing",

Perhaps

also,

to

make

our

dissent

"free-

it would be helpful to add footnotes wherever

they may enlighten a reader who has not read any opinion
other

than ours.

This would require,

perhaps,

a

little

fuller exposition in footnotes of the government's policy
that for many years encouraged mining claim holders to do
exactly

what

the

Lockes

did

in

this

case:

develop

property values that lay dormant and unused.

may

not

opinions.

4.

Use in the draft of the term "retroactively"

be

self

evident

unless

one

reads

the

other

A note could explain this.
5.

We

also

should make clear

in a

note

that

ordinarily parties are bound to the precise date specified
in

a

statute

duties
unique,

or

of

the

however

limitations or
filing
for

of
the

other
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the

imposition of other

claims.

This

summarized

by

case

is
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3.

Stevens' opinion (your page 3), plus the other reasons set
forth in your draft.
On
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page

3,

you

refer

considered

summarizing

the

to

JPS's

regulations

statutory

list

that

deadline

of

the

"BLM

confusing".

Perhaps a citation to the regulation would be appropriate.
And

when

was

the

pamphlet

issued

that

reinterpreted the filing date to be "on or before December
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* * *
Some
unnecessary

of

these

suggestions,

Dan,

may

in light of what others have written.

not have their opinions before me.
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I do

My basic thought is

that other Justices may be more inclined to join us if our
opinion

could

be

read

separately

with

a

firmer

understanding of what the government has done to the Locke
family in this case for no good purpose, and in a state of
confusion
process

that

requires

the

government

notice

opportunity to be heard.

that

itself
is

clear

recognizes.
as

well

Due
as

an

It is not easy to believe that,

in all of the circumstances, the notice of this forfeiture
of a property interest met the standard of clearness.
am

glad

you

suggested

the

desirability

of

a

I

separable

4.

dissent.

In view of what the doctors have in mind for me

beginning perhaps Thursday,
changes

along

appropriate.

the

I

suggest that you make such

lines of my suggestions as

you

think

Then have our dissent printed and circulated

as a first draft.

Of course, have a co-clerk read it both

for substance and cite checking.
The
indeed

if

all

case

will

the

votes

not be coming down next week
should

be

in,

ask

that

it

be

carried over for another week so that I can see the final
form.

But

I

would

like

to

move

getting it circulated.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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dissent
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MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

United States v. Locke, No. 83-1394.

I have drafted a dissent in this case for you to consider.

At this point, I have focused on the deadline rather than on

the irrebuttable presumption/abandonment issue.
for

two reasons.

I have done this

First, as JUSTICE REHNQUIST notes in his con.,.!

currence, JUSTICE MARSHALL has viewed the case in such a way that ~
he

ignores

the second

issue.

If your

dissent should become a

majority, plurality, or concurring opinion, it would probably be
necessary to discuss this issue, but you do not need to discuss
it now

in order

to respond to all of JUSTICE MARSHALL'S argu-

ments.

Second, I thought that you would probably stand a better

chance of having someone join you if at this point you wrote an
opinion addressing no more issues than are absolutely necessary.

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The
impose

a

Court

today

forfeiture

strictly

to

requirements

for

observe
that

I

believe

conditions

so

mining

the

Government can

claimholder 's

uncertain

imposed
that

failure

recording

not

only

a

but the agency itself did, mistake

that

deprives

a

that

retroactively

are

reasonable man might,
them.

holds

imposing a
the

forfeiture under

claimholder

of

these

property

in

violation of constitutional requirements.

-~

Faced with the difficulty stale mining claims had
created
Congress

in determining
enacted

§314

property
of

the

rights on public
Federal

Land

90 Stat.

2769,

This

existing

claimholders

their

claims

required

in order

to

retain

them.

olicy

u.s.c.

Management Act of 1976,
provision

43

0

The

lands,

to

and

§1744.
record

recordation

.,.

2.

requirement

at

issue

stated

that

"within

the

three-year

period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31
of each year

thereafter,"

id.

§1744 (a) , claimholders had

to file with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of
a notice of intention to retain the claim, an affidavit of
assessment work, or a special form,

id. §1744(1) and

(2).

Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly
filing

was

to

abandonment

of

"be

deemed

the

conclusively

mining

to constitute
n

claim

Id.

an

§1744(c).

There is no dispute that appellees complied fully with the
initial
arose
rather

recordation

after

they

than

prior

difference

in good

requirement.

filed
to,

their

December

faith

Rather,

first
31.

annual
It

is

the

dispute

notice

on,

this one-day

interpretation of the statutory

deadline that gives rise to the present controversy.

3.

a_~~

JUSTICE
circumstances

STEVENS

~ cast

Congress drafted
he notes that

correctly

points

doubt both on the care with which

§314 and on its meaning.

( i)

to 1\ S€Vera.!l

Specifically,

the section does not clearly describe

what must be filed, let alone when it must be filed;
BLM's

rewording

regulations

of

the

deadline

in

its

(ii)

implementing

indicates that the BLM itself considered the

statutory· deadline

confusing;

(iii)

lest

there

be

any

doubt that the BLM recognized this possible confusion, it
itself described the section in a pamphlet distributed to
miners
( i v)
quite

as

requiring

filing

"on or

before

December

31;"

~a.-r

BLM, wQ..ieh enforces the section, has interpreted it
flexibly;

holders

to file

and

(v)

irrationally

requiring

by one day before the end of

property
the year,

rather than by the end of the year itself, creates "a trap

4.

for the unwary," post, at 7.

As JUSTICE STEVENS

states,

these facts, particularly the last, suggest not only that
Congress
may

drafted

actually

§314

have

inartfully but also

intended

to

require

before," not "prior to," December 31.

that Congress
filing

"on

or

This is certainly

the more reasonable interpretation of congressional intent
and is consistent with all the policies of the Act.
I do not believe, however,

that given the special

circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress
actually

intended.

Takings

Clause

As

the

imposes

Court

today

some

limitations

Government's power to impose forfeitures.
In

Texaco,

Inc.

v.

Short,

454

u.s.

recognizes,
on

the
the

Ante, at 16-18.
516

(1982),

we

identified one of the most important of these limitations
when we stated that "the State has the power to condition

5.

the

permanent

performance

retention

of

of

reasonable

[a)

property

.

conditions

right

on

the

ld. '

at

526

(emphasis added); accord Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280,
290

("Cases

(1830)

provision

• • • may be

denial of a right,
court.") •

may

occur

where

so unreasonable as

retroactively

imposed

must meet due process standards, Usery v.

u.s.

to amount to a

and call for the interposition of the

Furthermore,

Mining Co., 428

[forfeiture)

a

conditions

Turner Elkhorn

1, 16-17 (1976), which require, among

other things, that an individual be able to determine what
actions he must
Texaco,

take

to protect his existing

Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533.

constitutional

protections

prevent

the

interests,

Together these
Government

from

depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily.

6.

In

the

present

case

there

is

no claim

yearly filing requirement is itself unreasonable.

that

a

Rather,

the claim arises from the fact that the language "prior to
December

31" creates uncertainty about when an otherwise

reasonable filing period ends.

Given the natural tendency

to interpret this phrase as

"by the end of the calendar

year,"

day

rather

calendar
high

year,"

standard

Takings

than

and

Certainly

the

I

"by

the

believe

of

the

this uncertainty violated

the

of

certainty

Due

Process

statement

before

and

at

end

definiteness

Clauses
in

the

together
least

one

that

the

require.
of

the

Government's own publications that filing was required "on
or

before

Staking

a

December
Mining

31,"
Claim

supports this conclusion.

Department
on

Federal

of

the

Lands

Interior,
10

(1978),

Terminating a property interest

.~

7.

because a property holder reasonably believed that under
the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing
requirements is no less arbitrary than terminating it for
failure

to

satisfy

these

unreasonable amount of time.

u.s.

55,

633

62

(1878).

(1902):

same

conditions

an

Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185

Terry v. Anderson, 95

Although

in

the

u.s.
may

latter

628, 632rest

on

impossibility, the former rests on good faith performance
a day late of what could easily have been performed the
day before.

Neither serves a purpose other than forcing

an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights to the State.
I believe the Constitution requires that the law
inform

the

definiteness
retroactively

property
than

did

imposed

holder
§314

with
when

recording

more
he

certainty

must

fulfill

requirements.

And,

and
any
at

.,
!

8.

least in 1980,

nothing cured this statutory uncertainty.

The regulations, as JUSTICE STEVENS notes, post, at 5 and
6, evidenced rather than dispelled the confusion, and it
was

not

until

the

following

year

that

the

BLM started

sending individual reminders of the filing requirements to
claimholders

each

September.

Such

notice,

although

not

required, could have made the deadline sufficiently clear
to have passed constitutional muster.
For the reasons above, I

~

dissent.

United States v. Locke, No. 83-1394.

----

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I
I

write

agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS'S dissent.
separately

only

because

under

the

special

circumstances of this case I do not believe it necessary
to decide what Congress actually
Court

is correct

intended.

Even if the

in believing that Congress intended to

require filings on or before the next-to-the-last day of
the year, rather than, more reasonably, by the end of the
calendar
uncertain

year
to

itself,
satisfy

the

statutory

constitutional

deadline

is

too

requirements.

It

simply fails to give property holders clear and definite
notice

of

~
1\.

what

they

must

do

to protect

their

existing

2.

As

the

Court

acknowledges,

ante,

at

1-2,

the

since the nineteenth century encouraged its
citizens to discover and develop certain minerals on the
public

lands.

Under

the general mining

laws,

30

u.s.c.

§22 et seq., an individual who locates a mining claim has
the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining
purposes and may extract and sell minerals he finds there
without paying a royalty to the federal government.

Id.

§26.

the

After

making

claimant may hold
worth

of

a

valuable

mineral

the claim so long as he performs $100

assessment

work

each

!d.

year.

performs certain additional conditions,
patent
further

..

the

claim

discovery,

for

a

nominal

sum

§28.

If

he

the claimant may

and

rights over the land and minerals.

thereby

obtain

See id.

§29.

,

·.

3.

Until

recently,

there

no

were

federal

recordation

requirements.

y~ ale mining claims had

F

~.,1-t;

created ~ i~g

~~
~

Congress

enacted

§314

Management Act of 1976,

1

property
of

the

rights
Federal

90 Stat.

2769,

on public
Land

lands,..

Policy

43 u.s.c.

and

§1744.

section 314(a),
43 u.s.c.
§1744(a), states in
entirety:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer
mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976,
shall, within the three-year period following
October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of
each
year
thereafter,
file
the
instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection.
The owner of an unpatented lode or
placer mining claim located after October 21,
1976 shall, prior to December 31 of each year
following the calendar year in which the said
claim was located, file the instruments required
by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.
"(1) File for record in the office where
the location notice or certificate is recorded
either a notice of intention to hold the mining
claim (including but not limited to such notices
as are provided by law to be filed when there
has been a suspension or deferment of annual
assessment work), an affidavit of assessment
Footnote continued on next page.

1

its

4.

This

provision

required

existing

claimholders

their claims in order to retain them.
it required

that

October

1976 and

21,

thereafter,"
Bureau

of

intention

id.

Land
to

(2).

record

More specifically,

"within the three-year period following
prior

to December

§1744(a),

Management
retain

assessment work,

to

or

a

31 of each year

claimholders
(BLM)

their
special

a

copy

claims,
form,

file
of

an
id.

a

with

the

notice

of

aff ida vi t

of

§1744(a) (1)

and

Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent

yearly filing was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute

work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed
report provided by section 28-1 of title 30,
relating thereto.
"(2)
File in the office of the Bureau
designated by the Secretary a copy of the
official record of the instrument filed or
recorded pursuant to paragraph
(1)
of this
subsection,
including
a
description of
the
location of the mining claim sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground."

'>

5.

an abandonment of the mining claim
Appellees

(the

Lockes)

Id. §1744(c).

II

are

owners

of

ten

unpatented mining claims on federal land in Nevada.
located

these

claims

1960,

earned

their

other

building

in

1952

livelihood
from

materials

and
by

1955

and

have,

producing

them.

From

They
since

gravel
1960

and

to

the

present, they have produced approximately $4,000,000 worth
of materials.

During the 1979-1980 assessment year alone,

1
~

~~~~~~
they

produced~ ~ r

$1,000,000 • ~h.

In

no

sense

were

their claims stale.
The
recordation

Lockes

fully

requirement

complied

by

properly

with

§314's

filing

a

initial

notice

of

~.J~
location on October 19, 1979.

In order to

f~t

how to

"'\
comply

with

requirements,

the

subsequent

the Lockes

yearly

recordation

sent their daughter, who worked

6.

in their business office, to the Ely, Nevada office of the

~~

BLM.

There

Hi:i-n'g

~
the assessment

she

inquired

Athey

into how

notice

and

should

was

told,

should be

filed

~

among

other

1\
things,

that

the

documents

office "on or before December 31, 1980."
advice,

at

the

Reno

Following this

the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at the

~~--

~date.

Reno office on

On April 4, 1981, they received

1\

notice

from

"abandoned

the
and

BLM
void,"

that

their

App.

to

mining

Juris.

claims

were

Statement

22a,

because they had filed on, rather than prior to, December
It

2

is

this

one-day

difference

in

good

faith

The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s] ubject to
valid intervening rights of third parties or the United
States void or abandoned claims or sites may be relocated
and, based on the new location date, the appropriate
instruments may be refiled within the time periods
prescribed by the regulations." App. to Juris. Statement
22a.
Unlike most claimants, however, the Lockes were
unable to relocate their claims because the Common
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

interpretation of

the statutory deadline that gives rise

to the present controversy.
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of
circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which
Congress drafted
he notes that

( i)

§314 and on its meaning.

Specifically,

the section does not clearly describe

what must be filed, let alone when it must be filed;
BLM's

rewording

of

the

deadline

in

its

(ii)

implementing
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS's dissent. I write
separately only because under the special circumstances of
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Congress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or
before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional
requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their
existing property interests.
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 1-2, the Government
since the nineteenth century has encouraged its citizens to
discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands.
Under the general mining laws, 30 U.S. C. §22 et seq., an
individual who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes and may
extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying a
royalty to the federal government. I d. § 26. Mter making
a valuable mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim
so long as he performs $100 worth of assessment work each
year. I d. § 28. If he performs certain additional conditions,
the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and
thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals.
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See id. § 29. Until recently, there were no federal recordation requirements.
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted § 314
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2769, 43 U.S. C. § 1744. 1 This provision required
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain
them. More specifically, it required that "within the threeyear period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December
31 of each year thereafter," id. § 1744(a), claimholders file
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment work, or a special form, id. § 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing
was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment
of the mining claim .... " I d. § 1744( c).
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of ten unpatented mining claims on federal land in Nevada. They located these
1

Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection.
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
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claims in 1952 and 1955 and have, since 1960, earned their
livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials
from them. From 1960 to the present, they have produced
approximately $4,000,000 worth of materials. During the
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and
other materials worth more than $1,000,000. In no sense
were their claims stale.
The Lockes fully complied with § 314's initial recordation
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the subsequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the
Ely, Nevada office of the BLM. There she inquired into how
and when they should file the assessment notice and was told,
among other things, that the documents should be filed at the
Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." Locke v.
United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following
this advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at
the Reno office on that date. On April4, 1981, they received
notice from the BLM that their mining claims were "abandoned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they
had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31. 2 It is this
one-day difference in good faith interpretation of the statutory deadline that gives rise to the present controversy.
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground."
2
The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s]ubject to valid intervening rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regulations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however,
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of common building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable
loss of their claims-the source of their livelihoods.
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JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress
drafted § 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let
alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1),
indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requiring filing "on or before December 31 ;" (iv) BLM, charged with
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 7. As
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly states, these facts, particularly
the last, suggest not only that Congress drafted § 314
inartfully but also that Congress may actually have intended
to require filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31.
This is certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional intent and is consistent with all the policies of the
Act.
I do not believe, however, that given the special circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. In Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a]
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions
. ... " ld., at 526 (emphasis added); accord Jackson v.
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a
[forfeiture] provisio[n] . . . may be so unreasonable as to
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of
the court ... "). Furthermore, conditions, like those here,
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imposed after a property interest is created must also meet
due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require,
among other things, that there be no question as to what
actions an individual must take to protect his interests.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily.
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" creates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing
period ends. Given the natural tendency to interpret this
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty
and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The statement in at least one of the Government's own publications
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Department of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a
property interest because a property holder reasonably believed that under the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than terminating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633
(1878). Although the latter may rest on impossibility, the
former rests on good faith performance a day late of what
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of
property rights to the State.
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than
did § 314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the stat-
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utory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for
filing on December 31 to be invalid. 3
I accordingly dissent.

3
Parties ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their failing
strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as to statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines clearly specified. Because of
the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitutional concerns identified above, this case is unique.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether
the Constitution prevents Congress from providing that holders of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall
forfeit their claims.
I
JUSTICE MARSHALL

nJ) A

From the enactment of the general mining laws in the nineteenth century until1976, those who sought to make their living by locating and developing minerals on federal lands were
virtually unconstrained by the fetters of federal control.
The general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. § 22 et seq., still in
effect today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop
certain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed
by the minimal procedures required to fonnally "locate" the
deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession
of the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as
$100 of assessment work is perfonned annually, the individual may continue to extract and sell minerals from the claim
without paying any royalty to the United States, 30 U. S. C.
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and after certain statutory conditio~ a:e fulftlled, an inrlividual may patent the claim,
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thereby purchasing from the federal government the land
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patenting, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963).
By the 1960s, it had become clear that this nineteenth century laissez faire regime had created virtual chaos with respect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that
more than six million unpatented mining claims existed on
public lands other than the national forests; in addition, more
than half the land in the National Forest System was thought
to be covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65
(1975). Many of these claims had been dormant for decades,
and many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence
of a federal recording system, no simple way existed for
determining which public lands were subject to mining locations, and whether those locations were valid or invalid.
Ibid. As a result, federal land managers had to proceed
slowly and cautiously in taking any action affecting federal
land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) proposed a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a
title search in the county recorder's office was necessary; if
an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale
or apparently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication
was required to determine the validity of the claim. 1
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the
context of a broader inquiry into the proper management of
the public lands in the modern era, Congress in 1976 enacted
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No.
94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1784).
Section 314 of the Act establishes a federal recording system
that is designed both to rid federal lands of stale mining
claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date
1

See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219.
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information that allows them to make informed land manage- t-o""""'"~ tQ./1
ment decisions. 2 For claims located before FLPMA's enact- 1
ment, 3 the federal recording system imposes two requirements. First, the claims must initially be recorded with the
BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's enactment, a
copy of the official record of the notice or certificate of location. 90 Stat. 2743, §314(b); 43 U.S. C.§ 1744(b). Second,
every year after the initial recording, and "prior to December
31,'' the claimant must file with state officials and with BLM l
a notice of intention to hold the claim , an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting I
1

The text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
(a) Filing requirements
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection....
(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), and affidavit
of assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of
the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely filing
The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b)
of this subsection shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site.... "
1
A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October
21, 1976, the date the Act was passed.
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fonn. 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(a); 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a). Section
314(c) of the Act provides that failure to comply with either of
these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner."
43 U. S. C. § 1744(c).
The second of these requirements-the annual filing obligation-has created the dispute underlying this appeal.
Appellees, four individuals "engaged in the business of
operating mining properties in Nevada," 4 purchased in 1960
and 1966 ten unpatented mining claims on public lands near
Ely, Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel
and building material: the claims are valued at several million
dollars, 5 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appellees' gross income totalled more than one million dollars. 6
Throughout the period during which they owned the claims,
appellees complied with annual state law filing and assessment work requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied
FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing
with BLM a notice of location, thereby putting their claims
on record for purposes of FLPMA.
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on
time their first annual obligation to file with the federal government. After allegedly receiving misleading infonnation
from a BLM employee, 1 appellees waited until December 31
• Plaintifr's Complaint '2.
'Plaintifr's Complaint ' 15.
•Lock~ v. United State3, 573 F . Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to
1980, total gross income from the claims exceeded four million dollars.

Ibid.
1
An affidavit submitted to the District Court by one of appellees'
employees stated that BLM officials in Ely had told the employee that the
filing could be made at the BLM Reno office "on or before December 31,
1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke '3. The 1978 ver5ion of a BLM Question and Answer pamphlet erroneously stated that the annual filings had to
be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Staking a Claim on
Federal Lands 9-10 (1978). Later ver5ions have corrected this error to

I
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to submit to BLM the annual notice of intent to hold or proof
of assessment work performed required under section 314(a)
ofFLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a). As noted above, that section requires these documents to be filed annually "prior to
December 31." Had appellees checked, they further would
have discovered that BLM regulations made quite clear that
claimants were required to make the annual filings in the
proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calender year." 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a) (1980) (current version at
43 CFR 3833.2-l(b)(l). Thus, appellees' filing was one day
too late.
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when
they received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office informing them that their claims had been declared abandoned
and void due to their tardy filing. In many cases, loss of a
claim in this way would have minimal practical effect; the
claimant could simply locate the same claim again and then
rerecord it with BLM. In this case, however, relocation of
appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees'
predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611; that Act probring the pamphlet into accord with the BLM regulations that require the
filings to be made "on or before Deeember 30."
JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE PoWELL seek to make much of this pamphlet and of the uncontroverted evidence that appellees were told a December 31 filing would comply with the statute. See post, at 6, 11, 12.
However, at the time appellees filed in 1980, BLM regulations and the
then-current pamphlets made clear that the filing was required "on or
before Deeember 30." Thus, the dissenters' reliance on this pamphlet
would seem better direeted to the claim that the United States was equitably estopped from forfeiting appellees' claims, given the advice of the BLM
agent and the objective basis the 1978 pamphlet provides for crediting the
claim that such advice was given. The District Court did not consider this
estoppel claim. Without expressing any view as to whether, as a matter
of law, appellees could prevail on such a theory, see Heckler v. Community
Health Services, Inc.,- U. S . - (1984), we leave any further treatment of this issue, including fuller development of the reeord, to the District Court on remand.
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spectively barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by
appellees' claims. Appellees' mineral deposits thus escheated to the Government.
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the
present action in 'the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that
§ 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property
without just compensation and denied them due process. On
summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) did
indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they were
constitutionally due. The District Court reasoned that
§ 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption
that claimants who failed to make a timely filing intended to
abandon their claims. Rather than relying on this presumption, the Government was obliged, in the District Court's
view, to provide individualized notice to claimants that their
claims were in danger of being lost, followed by a post-filing
deadline hearing at which the claimants could demonstrate
that they had not, in fact, abandoned a claim. Alternatively,
the District Court held that the one-day late filing "substantially complied" with the Act and regulations.
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress unconstitutional in a civil sUit to which the United States was
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252. - - U. S. - - (1984). 8 We now reverse.
• That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court.
Uni.Ud. States v. Rock Royal Cooprrative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939).
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared section 314(c)
unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to
meet the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion.
Ragen v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D Mont. 1982).
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II
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27 n. 7 (1960).
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court.
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1979). 9 These
principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews, --U.S. - - , - (1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974);
d. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal
Appeals Act); see generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(1936). Thus, we turn first to the nonconstitutional questions pressed below.

III
A
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the section 314(a) requirement of a filing ''prior to December 31 of
each year" should be . construed to require a filing "on or
• When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instructions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S.
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23
(1979). The choice between these options depends on the extent to which
lower court factfi.nding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will
be necessary or useful to our disposition of those questions.

' ',
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before December 31." Thus, appellees argued, their December 31 filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the
BLM had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims.
Although the District Court did not address this argument,
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra.
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even
appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) ''is a statement
that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th. I think
that is a clear statement ... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also
id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would require a
December 30th filing . . . ."). While we will not allow a
literal reading of a statute to produce a result "demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic
ContractOTS, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), with respect to
filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those words. To attempt to
decide whether some date other than the one set out in the
statute is the date actually ''intended" by Congress is to set
sail on an aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline
would be just as well served by nearly any date a court might
choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in the statute. "Actual purpose is sometimes unlmown," U. S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (STEVENS, J., concurring), and such is the case with filing
deadlines; as might be expected, nothing in the legislative
history suggests why Congress chose December 30 over
December 31, or over September 1 (the end of the assessment year for mining claims, 30 U. S. C. § 28), as the last day
on which the required filings could be made. But "[d]eadlines are inherently arbitrary," while fixed dates "are often
essential to accomplish necessary results." United States v.
Boyle, U. S. - , (1984). Faced with the inherent arbitrariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in a
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civil case, apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute.
Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449
u.s. 166, 179 (1980). l0
Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31"
means what it says. As the cUITent version of the filing
regulations states:
The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on
Federal lands ... shall have filed or caused to have been
filed on OT before December 30 of each calendar year . . .
evidence of annual assessment work performed during
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to
hold the mining claim. 43 CFR § 3833.2-1.
See also 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR
3833.2-1(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1 (a) (1980) (same);
43 CFR 3833.2-1(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1)
(1978) (''prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR 3833.2-l(a)(1) (1977)
(''prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly inform claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing of
a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must be
done priar to December 31 of each year, i. e, on or before
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining§ 7.23D, at 150.2
(1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, who
were businessmen involved in the running of a major mining
11

Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle,- U.S.-, (BRENNAN, J. , concuning). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit
provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonable cause
exception to the Code's filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no analogous provision.

•',
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operation for more than 20 years, had any questions about
whether a December 31 filing complied with the statute, it
was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other businessmen,
see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the regulations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice.
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission
of a last-minute filing, would surely have led appellees to the
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they
could file safely.
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed
by congressional reliance on the words ''prior to December
31." See post (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the fact that
Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight
does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an
effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have
failed to do. "There is a basic difference between filling a
gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil Oil
C<Yrp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978). Nor is
the judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear import
of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those
words lead to a harsh result. See Northwest Airlines v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U. S. 77, 98 (1981). On the
contrary, deference to the supremacy of the legislature, as
well as recognition that congressmen typically vote on the
language of a bill, generally require us to assume that "the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9
(1962). "Going behind the plain language of a statute in
search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to
be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances."
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 75 (1982)
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1,
26 (1977)). When even after taking this step nothing in the
legislative history remotely suggests a congressional intent
contrary to Congress' chosen words, and neither appellees

·' .
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nor the dissenters have pointed to anything that so suggests,
any further steps take the courts out of the realm of interpretation and place them in the domain of legislation. The
phrase "prior to" may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear. 11
Under these circumstances, we are obligated to apply the
"prior to December 31" language by its terms. See, e. g.,
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982);
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 u. s. 102, 108 (1980).
The agency's regulations clarify and confirm the import of
the statutory language by making clear that the annual
filings must be made on or before December 30. These regulations provide a conclusive answer to appellees' claim, for
where the language of a filing deadline is plain and the agency's construction completely consistent with that language,
the agency's construction simply cannot be found "sufficiently
unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981).
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of dis- ·
ingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question.
Moore Ice Cream v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1932) (Cardozo, J.). 12 We therefore hold that BLM did not act ultra
vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely.
u Legislative drafting books are filled with suggestions that the phrase
"prior to" be replaced with the word "before," see, e. g., R. Dickerson,
Materials on Legal Drafting 293 (1981), but we have seen no suggestion
that "prior to" be replaced with "on or before"-a phrase with obviously
different substantive content.
~we note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 15 provisions that
contemplate action "prior to December 31." See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5); 12
U. S. C. § 1709; 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a) (5)(A); 22
U. S. C. § 3784(c); 26 U. S. C. § 503 (d)(l); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a) (5)(B);
42 U.S. C. §415(a)(1)(c)(ii); 42 U.S. C. § 1692-17(b); 42 U. S. C.
§ 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2); 43 U. S. C.
§ 1744(a); 50 U. S.C, App. § 41; 50 U. S. C., App. § 1741. Dozens of state
statutes and local ordinances undoubtedly incorporate similar "prior to December 31" deadlines. In addition, legislatures know how to make explicit

l
l-
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B
Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing
requirements of§§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim."
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a
congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings
have not been made and for which the claimants have a specific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District
Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss
of a claim turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior
hearing and findings on the claimant's intent were constitutionally required before the claim of a non-filing claimant
could be extinguished.
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the specific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed
to make the required filings, the District Court began from
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of
an intent to allow action on December 31 when they employ a Deeember 31
date in a statute. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(2); 22 U. S. C. § 3303; 43

u. s. c. § 256.

It is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are
meant to apply to all of these provisions, or only to some of them; if the
latter, we are given little guidance as to how a court is to go about the
rather ecleetic task of choosing which "prior to Deeember 31" deadlines it
can interpret "'fiexibly." Understandably enough, the dissenters seek to
disavow any intent to call all these "prior to December 31" deadlines into
question and assure us that this is a ''unique case," post, at 6 n. 3 (POWELL,
J., dissenting), involving a "unique factual matrix," post, at 11 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). The only thing we can find unique about this particular
Deeember 31 deadline is that the dissenters are willing to go through such
tortured reasoning to evade it.

83-1394-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

13

mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "abandonment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of
law must be shown. See, e. g., 2 American Law of Mining
§ 8.2, at 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court).
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute
any intent to depart from the term-of-art meaning of "abandonment" at common law, the District Court concluded that
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional commonlaw distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus,
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual intent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the failure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a
specific intent to abandon his property.
This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1, 59 (1910), this principle is a guide to legislative intent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be applied
in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and logic. Although § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive presumption of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that Congress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims for
which the filing requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) had not
been met.
To begin with, the Senate version of § 314(c) provided that
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th
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Cong., 1st Sess., - - Cong. Rec. S2371 (Feb. 25, 1976). 13
The Committee Report accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indicated that failure to comply with the filing requirements
would make a claim "void." See S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65,
66 (1975). The House legislation and reports merely repeat
the statutory language without offering any explanation of it,
but it is clear from the Conference Committee Report that
the undisputed intent of the Senate-to make "void" those
claims for which proper filings were not timely made-was
the intent of both chambers. The Report stated: "Both the
Senate bill and House amendments provided for recordation
of mining claims and for extinguishment of abandonded
claims." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62
(1976) (emphasis added).
In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give
effect to the "deemed conclusively'' language of § 314(c). If
the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant to
prove that he intends to keep the claim, nothing "conclusive"
is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought to avoid
this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extinguish automatically those claims for which initial recordings, as
opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial
recordings and annual filings on the ground that the dominant purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the
"awesome task of searching every local title record" to establish initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp. 472,
477, (D. Nev. 1983). Once this purpose had been satisfied by
an initial recording, the primary purposes of the conclusive
presumption, in the District Court's view, had been met.
But the clear language of§ 314(c) admits of no distinction be12
The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Committee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal
law required.
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tween initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either
"shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment."
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of§ 314(c) is
also misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement;
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to
keep the system established in § 314 up to date on a yearly
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system current through its own inquiry into the status of recorded
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led Congress initially to make the federal recording .system selfexecuting. The purposes of a self-executing recording system are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially,
by the annual filing obligation as by the initial recording
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only initial recordings.
For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time,
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 619, 628 (CA9 1981).

c
A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying
primarily on Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., 400 U. S. 48 (1970), the
District Court held that, even if the statute required a filing
on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially complied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept this view
of the statute.
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the
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least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting
principle. If one-day late filings are acceptable, ten-day late
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall
just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a
lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle,
U. S. - , (1984). A filing deadline cannot be
complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late-even by one day.
Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., supra, does not support a contrary
conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not hold, that
failure to meet the annual assessment work requirements of
the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. § 28, which require that
''not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or
improvements made during each year," would not render a
claim automatically void. Instead, if an individual complied
substantially but not fully with the requirement, he might
under some circumstances be able to retain possession of his
claim.
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be performed each year is significantly different from the complete
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for failure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress
had intended to make the assessment work requirement

83-1394--0PINION
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

17

merely an indicia of a claimant's specific intent to retain a
claim. Full compliance with the assessment work requirements would establish conclusively an intent to keep the
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a caseby-ease determination of whether he nonetheless intended to
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57.
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads automatically to loss of the claim. See supra Part IIB. Thus,
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indicative of the claimant's intent-intent is simply irrelevant if
the required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of
substantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners
no greater latitude with filing deadlines than have other
individuals. 14
1
•

Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the following January 19th. 43 CFR 3833.0-S(m) (1983). Appellees and the dissenters attempt to transform this regulation into a blank check, generally
authorizing "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements. We
disagree for two reasons. First, the regulation was not in effect when
appellees filed in 1980; it therefore cannot be relied on now to validate a
purported "substantial compliance" in 1980. Second, that an agency has
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not require the
agency to accept all documents hand delivered any time before January
19th. Appellees' view would lead to an inftnite regression in which each
time a mailing-receipt deadline was extended to make it congruent with the
deadline for hand delivery, the hand-delivery deadline would have to be
extended in turn to make it the same as the postmark deadline for mailed
filings; if, as appears to be appellees' view, documents hand delivered on
January 19th must be accepted, it is equally plausible to argue that docu-
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IV
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion necessarily falls with our conclusion that § 314(c) automatically
deems forfeited those claims for which the required filings
are not timely made. The District Court's invalidation of the
statute rested heavily on the view that § 314(c) creates an
''irrebuttable presumption that mining claims are abandoned
if the miner fails to timely file" the required documents-that
the statute presumes a failure to file to signify a specific
intent to abandon the claim. But, as we have just held,
§ 314(c) presumes nothing about a claimant's actual intent;
the statute simply and conclusively deems such claims to be
forfeited. As a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) is not subject to
the individualized hearing requirement of such irrebuttable
presumption cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973)
or Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974), for there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting
§ 314(c), Congress was in any way concerned with whether a
particular claimant's tardy filing or failure to file indicated an
actual intent to abandon the claim.
There are suggestions in the District Court's opinion that,
even understood as a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) might be
unconstitutional. We therefore go on to consider whether
automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to make annual
filings is constitutionally permissible. The framework for
ments postmarked on January 19th should al.5o be accepted. The agency
rationally could decide that either of the options in this situation-requiring mailings to be received by the same date that hand deliveries must be
made or requiring mailings to be postmarked by that date-is a sound way
of administering the statute.
JUSTICE STEVENS further suggests that BLM would have been well
within its authority to promulgate regulations const.rWng the statute to
allow for December 31st filings. Assuming the correctness of this suggestion, the fact that two interpretations of a statute are equally reasonable
suggests to us that the agency's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable as
to be acceptable. See FEC v. Democrru:tic Senatorial Campaign Committee, SUp1'Tl, 454 U. S., at 39.

'

'
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analysis of this question, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions, is set forth by our recent decision in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). There we upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed mineral interest that had not been used for a period of 20 years automatically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of
the property, unless the mineral owner filed a statement of
claim in the county recorder's office within two years of the
statute's passage.
A
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of affirmative legislative power: whether Congress is authorized
to "provide that property rights of this character shall be
extinguished if their owners do not take the affinnative action required by the" statute. Id., at 516. Even with respect to vested property rights, a legislature generally has \
the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way
in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued
retention on perfonnance of certain affinnative duties. As
long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the
legislature acts within its powers in imposing such new constraints or duties. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Turner v. New York, 168 U. S.
90, 94 (1897); Vance v. Vance 108 U. S. 514, 517 (1883); Terry
v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (1877). "(L]egislation adjusting
rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (citations omitted).
This power to qualify existing property rights is particularly broad with respect to the "character" of the property
rights at issue here.
Although owners of unpatented mining claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their
claims, see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S.
334, 335 (1963), we have recognized that these interests are a
''unique fonn of property." I d., at 334. The United States,
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as owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain,
maintains broad powers over the terms ·and conditions upon
which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired.
See, e. g., Kleppe v. Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976).
"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no
higher quality and no more immune from attack and investigation that are unpatented claims under the homestead and kindred laws. If valid, it gives to the claimant
certain exclusive possessory rights, and so do homestead
and desert claims. But no right arises from an invlaid
claim of any kind. All must conform to the law under
which they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlawful private appropriation and derogation of the rights of
the public." Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450,
460 (1920).
Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over those interests. Cf. Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 413
(1983). In addition, the property right here is · ·
.
the right to a flow of income from production of the claim. Similar vested economic
rights are held subject to the Government's substantial
power to regulate for the public good the conditions under
which business is carried out and to redistribute the benefits
and burdens of economic life. See, e. g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., - U.S. (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
supra; see generally Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S.
300, 315 (1920) (''in the interest of the community, [govern: ment may] limit one [right] that others may be enjoyed").
l'n.~Against this background, there can be no doubt that Con" · gress could condition initial receipt of an unpatented mining
claim upon an agreement to perform annual assessment work
and make annual filings. That this requirement was applied
to claims already located by the time FLPMA was enacted
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and thus applies to vested claims does not alter the analysis, '
for any ''retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means
.... " PBSC v. R. A. Gray & Co.,- U. S. (1984).
The purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to claims
located before the Act was passed-to rid federal lands of
stale mining claims and to provide for centralized collection
by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-to-date information on the status of recorded but unpatented mining
claims-are clearly legitimate. In addition, § 314(c) is a reasonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of their claims those claimants who fail to file
provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing requirements, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance
enables federal land managers to know with certainty and
ease whether a claim is currently valid. Finally, the restriction attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must
simply file a paper once a year indicating that the required
assessment work has been performed or that they intend to
hold the claim. 16 Indeed, appelles could have fully protected
Appellees suggest that Texaco further requires that the restriction
imposed be substantively reasonable in the sense that it adequately relate
to some common law conception of the nature of the property right involved. Thus, appellees point to the fact that, in Texaco, failure to file
could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition, the mineral interest had lain
dormant for 20 years; according to appellees, conjunction of a 20-year
dormancy period with failure to file a statement of claim sufficiently indicated abandonment, as that term is understood at common law, to justify
the statute.
Common-law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to retain
his property until the common-law would recognize it as abandoned. Legislatures can enact substantive rules of law that treat property as forfeited
under conditions that the common-law would not consider sufficient to indicate abandonment. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467
("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his rights or
property? It is clear that the subject is one over which every community
is at liberty to make a rule for itself"). As long as proper notice of these
11

·.
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their interests against the effect of the statute by taking the
minimal additional step of patenting the claims. As a result,
Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting
the filing requirements, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment set forth in § 314(c), and in applying the requirements and sanction to claims located before FLPMA was
passed.
B
We look next to the substantive effect of§ 314(c) to determine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting
it because it works an impermissible intrusion on constitutionally protected rights. With respect to the regulation of
private property, any such protection must come from the
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private
property without just compensation. On this point, however, Texaco is controlling: ''this Court has never required
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law.
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time-not
the action of Congress-that caused the property right to be
extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take"
rules exists, and the burdens they impose are not so wholly disproportionate to the burdens other individuals face in a highly regulated society that
some people are being forced "alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960), the burden imposed is a reasonable restriction on the property right. Here Congress ha.s chosen to redefine the way in which an unpatented mining claim can be lost through
imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objectives, imposes the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes effect
only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply and a
reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets these
standards is sufficient, under Tnaco, to make it a reasonable restriction on
the continued retention of the property right.
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private property when an individual's reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long
as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the \
legislature has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoene, 276
U. S. 272, 279-280; Terry v. Anderson, supra, 95 U. S., at
632-633; cf. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457. 466
("What right has any one to complain, when a reasonable
time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in asserting his rights?").

c

Finally, the Act provides appellees with all the process
that is their constitutional due. In altering substantive
rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a
legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the
extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to
familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454
U. S., at 532; see also Atkins v. Block,- U. S. - , (1985); Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233,
243 (1944); North Laramie Land Co. v. Horrman, 268 U. S.
276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt that the Act's
recording provisions meet these minimal requirements. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners of existing
claims, such as appellees, were not required to make an initial recording until October 1979. This three-year period,
during which individuals could become familiar with the
requirements of the new law, surpasses the two-year grace
period we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of mineral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific annual filing
obligation at issue in this case is not triggered until the year
after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, every claimant in appellees' position already has filed once before the
annual filing obligations come due. That these claimants already have made one filing under the Act indicates that they

l
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know, or must be presumed to know, of the existence of the
Act and of their need to inquire into its demands. 16 The requirement of an annual filing thus was not so unlikely to come
to the attention of those in the position of appellees as to render unconstitutional the notice provided by the three-year
grace period. 17
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards
laid down in . Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court
seemed to believe that individualized notice of the filing deadlines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The District Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great benefit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a
sound means of administering the Act. 18 But in the regulation of private property rights, the Constitution offers the
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative
11

As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in character, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average citizen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a
heightened awareness of one's legal obligations." Texaco, 454 U. S., at
547 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
11
BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for
failure to make a timely filing.
11
In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last several years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several
months before the end of the year; according to the Government, these
notices state that "you must file on or before 12/30 [of the relevant year.]
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22.
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routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to say
that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a national
recording system] rationally; whether a [different notice
scheme] would have been wiser or more practical under the
circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension."
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S. 1, 19 (1975).
Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place
a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the
national recording system work. See Ibid; Weinberger v.
Salji, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publications Seroice, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The District Court
therefore erred in invoking the Constitution to supplant the
valid administrative scheme established by Congress. The
judgment below is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83- 1394

UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
MADISON D. LOCKE ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

[March-, 1985]
JUSTICE STEVENS,

with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,

dissenting.
The Court's opinion is contrary to the intent of Congress,
engages in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, and unjustly creates a trap for unwary property owners. First, the
choice of the language "prior to December 31" when read in
context in 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a) 1 is, at least, ambiguous, and,

I

1

The full text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 reads as follows:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21 , 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21 , 1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection:
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work) , an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
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at best, "the consequence ·of a legislative accident, perhaps
caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it
should." 2 In my view, Congress actually intended to
authorize an annual filing at any time prior to the close of
business on December 31st, that is, prior to the end of the
calendar year to which the filing pertains. 3 Second, even if
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
"(b) Additional filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely
filing
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and
(b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site.
"(d) Validity of claims, waiver of assessment, etc., as unaffected
"Such recordation or application by itself shall not render valid any claim
which would not be otherwise valid under applicable law. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as a waiver of the assessment and other requirements of such law."
2
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 97 (1977)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
8
This view was expressed at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute
in July of 1977:

83-1394-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

3

Congress irrationally intended that the applicable deadline
for a calendar year should end one day before the end of the
calendar year that has been recognized since the amendment
of the Julian calendar in 8 B. C., it is clear that appellees
have substantially complied with the requirements of the
statute, in large part because the Bureau of Land Management has issued interpreting regulations that recognize substantial compliance. Further, the Court today violates not
only the long-followed principle that a court should "not pass
on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided," 4 but also the principle that a court should
"not decide a constitutional question if there is some other
ground upon which to dispose of the case." 5
I
Congress enacted § 314 of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act to establish for federal land planners and
managers a federal recording system designed to cope with
the problem of stale claims, and to provide "an easy way of
"It is plain that Congress intended the filing requirement to expire with
the last day of the year, but inartful draftsmanship requires all filings
under Subsection 314(a) of the Act to be made on or before December 30th.
Such is the result of the unfortunate use of the words 'prior to December
31.' And since December 31st bears no relationship to the assessment
year, which ends at noon on September 1st of each year, the statutory
requirement that the locator shall file the necessary documents on or
before December 30th of each year following the calendar year in which
a claim was located, means that where a claim is located after noon on
September 1st in any calendar year, the locator must file in the next full
calendar year a notice of intention to hold, because no assessment work
requirement has yet arisen." Sherwood, Mining-claim Recordation and
Prospecting under The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
23 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1, 25 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
• United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27 (1980).
5
Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984)
(per curiam); see also Atkins v. Parker, --U.S. - - , - - (1985);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Justice Brandeis, concurring).
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discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or
invalid mining claim locations." 6 I submit that the appellees' actions in this -case did not diminish the importance of
these congressional purposes; to the contrary, their actions
were entirely consistent with the statutory purposes, despite
the confusion created by the "inartful draftsmanship" of the
statutory language. 7
A careful reading of§ 314 discloses at least three respects
in which its text cannot possibly reflect the actual intent of
Congress. First, the description of what must be filed in the
initial filing and subsequent annual filings is quite obviously
garbled. Read literally, § 314(a)(2) seems to require that a
notice of intent to hold the claim and an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim must be filed "on a detailed report provided by§ 28-1 of Title 30." One must substitute the word "or" for the word "on" to make any sense at
all out of this provision. This error should cause us to pause
before concluding that Congress commanded blind allegiance
to the remainder of the literal text of§ 314.
Second, the express language of the statute is unambiguous in describing the place where the second annual filing
shall be made.
If the statute is read inflexibly, the owner
must "file in the office of the Bureau" the required documents. 8 Yet the regulations that the Bureau itself has
drafted, quite reasonably, construe the statute to allow filing
in a mailbox, provided that the document is actually received
by the Bureau prior to the close of business on January 19th

1

6
S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975). The Court
agrees regarding the first purpose, but inexplicably and without citation
concludes that another purpose of section 314 is "to provide federal land
managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed
management decisions." Ante, at 2-3. This latter statutory "purpose" is
not mentioned in the legislative history; rather, it is a variation of a "purpose," equally without citation, offered by appellants. See Brief of Appellants 45, 47.
7
See n. 3, supra.
8
See 43 u.s. c. §1744(a)(2).
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of the year following the year in which the statute requires
the filing to be made. 9 A notice mailed on December 30,
1982, and received by the Bureau on January 19, 1983, was
filed "in the office of the Bureau" during 1982 within the
meaning of the statute, but one that is hand-delivered to the
office on December 31, 1982, cannot be accepted as a 1982
"filing."
The Court finds comfort in the fact that the implementing
regulations have eliminated the risk of injustice. Ante, at
9-10. But if one must rely on those regulations, it should be
apparent that the meaning of the statute itself is not all that
obvious. To begin with, the regulations do not use the language "prior to December 31;" instead, they use "on or before
December 30 of each year." 10 The Bureau's drafting of the
regulations using this latter phrase indicates that the meaning of the statute itself is not quite as "plain," ante, at 8, as
the Court assumes; if the language were plain, it is doubtful
43 CFR § 3833. 0-5(m) provides:
" 'Filed or file' means being received and date stamped by the proper BLM
office. For the purpose of complying with § 3833.2-1 of this title, 'timely
filed' means being filed within the time period prescribed by law, or received by January 19th after the period prescribed by law in an envelope
bearing a clearly dated postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service within the period prescribed by law. This 20 day period does not apply
to a notice of location filed pursuant to § 3833.1-2 of this title. (See
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the last day falls on a date the office is
closed.)"
10
43 CFR § 3833.2-l(b)(l). It is undisputed that the regulations did not
come to the attention of the appellees. To justify the forfeiture in this
case on the ground that appellees are chargeable with constructive notice
of the contents of the Federal Register is no more acceptable to me today
than it would have been to Justice Jackson in 1947. "To my mind, it is an
absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows what the
Federal Register contains or even knows that there is such a publication.
If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued
from time to time in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for
he would never get time to plant any crops." Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. v. Merril, 332 U. S. 380, 387 (1947) (Justice Jackson, dissenting) .
9

..
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that the Bureau would have found it necessary to change the
language at all. Moreover, the Bureau, under the aegis of
the Department of tbe Interior, once issued a pamphlet entitled "Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands" that contained the following information:
"Owners of claims or sites located on or before Oct. 21,
1976, have until Oct. 22, 1979, to file evidence of assessment work performed the preceding year or to file a
notice of intent to hold the claim or site. Once the claim
or site is recorded with BLM, these documents must be
filed on or before December 31 of each subsequent year."
Id., at 9-10 (1978) (emphasis added).
"Plain language," ante, at 8, indeed.
There is a more important reason why the implementing
regulations cannot be supportive of the result the Court
reaches today: the Bureau's own deviation from the statutory
language in its mail-filing regulation. See supra, n. 9. If
the Bureau had issued regulations expressly stating that a
December 31 filing would be considered timely-just as it has
stated that a mail filing received on January 19th is timelyit is inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of
its regulation. It appears, however, that the Bureau has
more power to interpret an awkwardly drafted statute in an
enlightened manner consistent with Congress' intent than
does this Court. 11
The Court, ante, at 17, n. 14, criticizes my citation of the BLM regulations to demonstrate that the agency has itself departed from the "plain"
statutory language by allowing mail filings to be received by January 19th.
In the same breath, the Court acknowledges that the agency is not bound
by the "plain" language in "administering the statute." Ibid. The maildelivery deadline makes it clear that the Court's judicially created "up-todate" statutory purpose is utterly lacking in foundation. The agency's
adoption of the January 19th deadline illustrates that it does not need
the information by December 30; that it is not bound by the language of
the provision; and that subtantial compliance does not interfere with the
agency's statutory functions or with the intent of Congress.
11
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In light of the foregoing: I cannot believe that Congress
intended the words "prior to December 31 of each year" to be
given the literal reaaing the Court adopts today. The statutory scheme requires periodic filings on a calendar-year
basis. The end of the calendar year is, of course, correctly
described either as "prior to the close of business on December 31," or "on or before December 31," but it is surely
understandable that the author of § 314 might inadvertently
use the words "prior to December 31" when he meant to refer
to the end of the calendar year. As the facts of this case
demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can be made in
good faith. The risk of such an error is, of course, the greatest when the reference is to the end of the calendar year.
That it was in fact an error seems rather clear to me because
no one has suggested any rational basis for omitting just one
day from the period in which an annual filing may be made,
and I would not presume that Congress deliberately created
a trap for the unwary by such an omission.
It would be fully consistent with the intent of Congress to
treat any filing received during the 1980 calendar year as a
timely filing for that year. Such an interpretation certainly
does not interfere with Congress' intent to establish a federal
recording system designed to cope with the problem of stale
mining claims on federal lands. The system is established,
and apparently, functioning. 12 Moreover, the claims here
12

Several amici have filed materials listing numerous cases in which it is
asserted that the Bureau is using every technical construction of the statute to suck up active mining claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not
watched closely, will suck up jewelry or loose money. See Brief Amicus
Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation 2 (claiming that an "overwhelming number of mining claims have been lost to the pitfalls of section
314"), 3 (claiming that from 1977 to 1984 "unpatented mining claimants lost
almost 20,000 active locations due to the technical rigors and conclusive
presumption of section 314"), App. 1-86 (listing cases); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Alaska Miners Association, California Mining Association,
Nevada Mining Association, Miners Advocacy Council, and Placer Miners
Association Exhibit A (letter from Bureau's Utah State Office stating that
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were active; the Bureau was well aware that the appellees
intended to hold and to operate their claims.
Additionally, a sensible construction of the statute does not
interfere with Congress' intention to provide "an easy way of
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or
invalid mining claim locations." 13 The Bureau in this case
was well aware of the existence and production of appellees'
mining claims; only by blinking reality could the Bureau
reach the decision that it did. It is undisputed that the
appellees made the first 1980 filing on August 29, 1980, and
made the second required filing on December 31, 1980; the
Bureau did not declare the mining claims "abandoned and
void" until April 4, 1981. Thus, appellees lost their entire
livelihood for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of
Congress, and because of the hypertechnical construction of a
poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow
"filings" far beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but
then interprets inflexibly in others. 14 Appellants acknowlwell over 1400 claims were invalidated from 1979-1983 because§ 1744(a)(l)
filings were made on December 31), Exhibit B (letter from Bureau's
Billings, Montana Office stating that 198 claims were invalidated from
1979-1983 because§ 1744(a)(l) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit
C (letter from Bureau's Wyoming State Office stating that 11 claims were
invalidated in 1980-1982 because§ 1744(a)(2) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit D (letter from Bureau's Arizona State Office stating that
"approximately 500 claims have been invalidated due to filing an affidavit
one day late"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mobil Oil Corporation 2-4 (claiming
to be in a situation similar to the appellees'). According to the Bureau's
own calculations, thousands of active mining claims have been terminated
because filings made on December 31 were considered untimely. These
representations confirm the picture painted by amici of a federal bureaucracy virtually running amok, and surely operating contrary to the intent
of Congress, by terminating the valuable property rights of hard-working,
productive citizens of our country.
18
S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975).
14
The Court suggests that appellees' failure to file by December 30
"caused the property right to be extinguished." Ante, at 22. However,
the Court, on the one hand, carefully avoids mentioning the three-month

l
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edge that "[i]t may well be-that Congress wished to require
filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier
deadline resulted from careless draftmanship." Brief for
Appellants 42, n. 31. I have no doubt that Congress would
have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that filing
take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention had
been focused on this precise issue. Cf. DelCostello v. Teamsters, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984). 16
period that elapsed after December 31 before the Bureau declared the appellees' mining claims abandoned, and, on the other hand, describes
the Bureau as needing "up-to-date information that allows them to make
informed and expeditious land management decisions." Id., at 2-3, 21.
'~The Court, ante, at 11, n. 12, lists several provisions in the United
States Code as supportive of its position that "prior to December 31" is
somehow less ambiguous because of its occasional use in various statutory
provisions. It then states that it "is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are meant to apply to all of the provisions, or only
to some of them." Ibid. However, the provisions cited for support illustrate the lack of justification for the Court's approach, and highlight the
uniqueness of the provision in this case. Twelve of the thirteen provisions
refer to a on£_-t~~ecific date; the provision at issue here requires
specific action on a continual annual basis, thus involving a much greater
risk of creating a trap for the unwary. Further, each of the specific dates
mentioned in the twelve provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the
Court's premise, this decision would have no effect on them because they
require no future action. See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5) ("prior to December
31, 1937"); 12 U. S. C. § 1709)(o)(1)(e) ("prior to December 31, 1976");
12 U. S. C. § 1823(g) ("prior to December 31, 1950"); 12 U. S. C.
§ 1841(a)(5)(A) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1)
(''prior to December 31, 1955"); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a)(5)(B) ("prior to
December 31, 1974"); 42 U. S. C. § 415(a)(1)(c)(ii) ("prior to December 20,
1977"); 42 U. S. C. § 1962d-17(b) ("prior to December 31, 1969"); 42
U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5) ("after the first year following October 3, 1977, prior
to December 31"); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1982");
42 U. S. C. § 7521(b)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 50 U. S. C., App.
§ 41 ("prior to December 31, 1961"); 50 U. S. C., App. § 1741 ("prior to
December 31, 1970"). The remaining provision cited as authority by the
Court, 22 U. S. C. § 3784(c), states that the Panama Canal and certain
other property "shall not be transferred to the Republic of Panama prior to
December 31, 1999." The legislative history indicates that that language

,.,
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After concluding its constitutional analysis, the District
Court also held thai "the standard to be applied to assessment notice requirements is substantial compliance. Measured against this, the Lockes have satisfied their statutory
duties under Section 1744 by filing their notices one day
late." 16 The District Court grounded its holding on this
Court's analysis in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corporation, 400
u. s. 48 (1970).
In Hickel, the Court construed 30 U. S. C. §28, which
read:
"On each claim located after the lOth day of May 1872,
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than
$100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements
made during each year.... [U]pon a failure to comply
with these conditions, the claim or mine upon which
such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the
same manner as if no location of the same had ever been
made, provided that the original locators, their heirs,
assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed
work upon the claim after failure and before such location." (Emphasis added).
Recognizing that a claimant's "possessory title" should not be
disturbed on flimsy or insubstantial grounds," 400 U. S., at
57, the Court wrote:
"We agree . . . that every default in assessment work
does not cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however,
might be the equivalent of abandonment; and we now
hold that token assessment work, or assessment work
was added to make "clear that the President is not authorized to accelerate
the final transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, as provided by the Panama
Canal Treaty of 1977." H. R. Conf. Report 96-473, 96th Cong. , 1st Sess.
61 (1979). The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Art. II, indicates that it
"shall terminate at noon, Panama time, December 31, 1999." Therefore,
the language of section 3784(c) was tailored to a unique treaty provision.
18
Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 479 (D Nev. 1983).
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that does not substantially satisfy the requirements of 30
U. S. C. § 28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the claims
within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold
otherwise would help defeat the policy of the United
States, as the prospective recipient of royalties, a beneficiary of these oil shale claims. We cannot support
[Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306 (1930),] and [Ickes
v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639
(1935)], on so broad a ground. Rather, their dicta to the
contrary, we conclude that they must be confined to situations where there had been substantial compliance with
the assessment work requirements . . . . " 400 U. S.,
at 57.
Hickel thus demonstrates that the District Court was correct that subtantial-compliance analysis was appropriate in
this case, and that appellees substantially complied with
the statute. Appellees earned their livelihood since 1960 by
mining the ten unpatented mining claims now in dispute. 17
They paid income taxes, and property and production taxes
to the State of Nevada, which appears as an amici in support
of appellees. The statute, passed in 1976, required appellees
to register their mining claims "in the office where the location notice or certificate is recorded" and "in the office of
the Bureau" by October 21, 1979; it is undisputed that appellees met the statute's two initial filing requirements. 18
Moreover, the statute required, within three years of October 21, 1976, that appellees file "in the office of the Bureau
designated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of
the notice of location or certificate of location." 19 Appellees
also met this third requirement, thus completely informing
the Bureau of the existence, the sizes, the locations and the
ownership of appellees' active mining claims. After the
three initial filing requirements, the statute required that
17
18

19

I d., at 474.
Ibid.
43

u. s. c.

§ 1744(b).
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appellees make two separate annual filings: (1) an initial filing
with the county recorder; and (2) a copy of the official record
of the first filing filed with the Bureau. Appellees made the
first of these filings for the 1980 calendar year on August 29,
1980. Because 1980 was generally the first year that claimants-including appellees-had to comply with the annual
filing requirements that the new legislation mandated, the
Bureau began the practice of mailing reminder notices about
the filing due in the Bureau's office. Appellants acknowledge that appellees did not receive a reminder notice. 20 Nevertheless, appellees responsibly inquired about the date of
filing with the Bureau for the 1980 calendar year; it is undisputed that Bureau personnel informed them that the filing
was due "on or before December 31, 1980." 21 On December
31, 1980, appellees made a 700-mile round trip from Ely to
Reno, Nevada to hand deliver their filings to the Bureau.
The Bureau accepted the filings on that date.
In my view, this unique factual matrix unequivocally contradicts the statutory presumption of an intent to abandon by
reason of a late filing. In sum, this case presents an ambiguous statute, which, if strictly construed will destroy valuable
rights of appellees, property owners who have complied with
all local and federal statutory filing requirements apart from
a one-day "late" filing caused by the Bureau's own failure
to mail a reminder notice necessary because of the statute's
ambiguity and caused by the Bureau's information to appellees that the date on which the filing occurred would be
acceptable. Further, long before the Bureau declared a
technical "abandonment," it was in complete possession of all
information necessary to assess the activity, locations, and
ownership of appellees' mining claims and it possessed all
information needed to carry out its statutory functions. Finally, the Bureau has not claimed that the filing is contrary to
the congressional purposes behind the statute, that the filing
20

21

Reply Brief for Appellants 13, n. 12.
Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 1!3.
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affected the Bureau's land-use planning functions in any manner, or that it interfered "in any measurable way" with the
Bureau's need to obtain information. 22 A showing of substantial compliance necessitates a significant burden of proof;
appellees, whose active mining claims will be destroyed contrary to Congress' intent, have convinced me that they have
substantially complied with the statute.
I respectfully dissent .

22

Brief for Appellants 45.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
I agree that the District Court erred in holding that
§ 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(c), violates due process by
creating an "irrebuttable presumption" of abandonment.
Whatever the force of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973),
beyond the facts underlying that case, I believe that § 314(c)
comports with due process under the analysis of our later decision in Weinberger v. Salji, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Because
I also believe that the statute does not otherwise violate
the Fifth Amendment and that the District Court erred in its
alternative holding that substantial compliance satisfies the
filing requirements of § 314 and corresponding regulations, I
agree that the judgment below must be reversed. Nonetheless, I share many of the concerns expressed in the dissenting
opinions of JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS. If the
facts are as alleged by appellees, allowing the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to extinguish active mining claims that
appellees have owned and worked for more than 20 years
would seem both unfair and inconsistent with the purposes
underlying FLPMA.
The Government has not disputed that appellees sought in
good faith to comply with the statutory deadline. Appellees
contend that in order to meet the requirements of§ 314, they
contacted the BLM and were informed by agency personnel
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that they could file the required materials on December 31,
1980. Appellees apparently relied on this advice and handdelivered the appropriate documents to the local BLM office
on that date. The BLM accepted the documents for filing,
but some three months later sent appellees a notice stating
that their mining claims were "abandoned and void" because
the filing was made on, rather than prior to, December 31,
1980. Although BLM regulations clarify the filing deadlines
contained in § 314, the existence of those regulations does not
imply that appellees were unjustified in their confusion concerning the deadlines or in their reliance on the advice provided by BLM's local office. The BLM itself in 1978 issued
an explanatory pamphlet stating that the annual filings were
to be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Ante,
at 4, n. 7. Moreover, the BLM evidently has come to understand the need to clarify the nature of the annual filing
requirement, because it now sends reminder notices every
year to holders of recorded mining claims warning them that
the deadline is approaching and that filings must be made on
or before December 30.
The unusual facts alleged by appellees suggest that the
BLM's actions might estop the Government from relying on
§ 314(c) to obliterate a property interest that has provided a
family's livelihood for decades. The Court properly notes
that the estoppel issue was not addressed by the District
Court and will be open on remand. Ante, at 5, n. 7. In this
regard, I merely note that in my view our previous decisions
do not preclude application of estoppel in this context. In
Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County,
- - U. S. - - (1984), we expressly declined to adopt "a flat
rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against
the Government." I d., at - - . Such a rule was unnecessary to the decision in that case, and we noted our reluctance to hold that "there are no cases in which the public
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervail-
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ing interest of citizens in som~ minimum standard of decency,
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government." Id., at - - _(footnote omitted).
Although "it is well settled that the Government may not
be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," id., at
- - (footnote omitted), we have never held that the Government can extinguish a vested property interest that has been
legally held and actively maintained for more than 20 years
merely because the private owners relied on advice from
agency personnel concerning a poorly-worded statutory
deadline and consequently missed a filing deadline by one
day. Thus, if the District Court ultimately determines that
appellees reasonably relied on communications from the BLM
in making their annual filing on December 31, 1980, our previous decisions would not necessarily bar application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the fact that
the Court reverses the decision of the District Court does not
establish that appellees must ultimately forfeit their mining
claims.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS's dissent. I write
separately only because under the special circumstances of
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Congress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or
before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional
requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their
existing property interests.
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 1-2, the Government
since the nineteenth century has encouraged its citizens to
discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands.
Under the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., an
individual who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes and may
extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying a
royalty to the federal government. I d. § 26. After making
a valuable mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim
so long as he performs $100 worth of assessment work each
year. I d. § 28. If he performs certain additional conditions,
the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and
thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals.
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See id. § 29. Until recently, there were no federal recordation requirements.
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted § 314
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2769, 43 U.S. C. § 1744. 1 This provision required
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain
them. More specifically, it required that "within the threeyear period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December
31 of each year thereafter," id. § 1744(a), claimholders file
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment work, or a special form, id. § 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing
was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment
of the mining claim .... " !d. § 1744(c).
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of ten unpatented mining claims on federal land in Nevada. They located these
' Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection.
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
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claims in 1952 and 1955 and have, since 1960, earned their
livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials
from them. From-1960 to the present, they have produced
approximately $4,000,000 worth of materials. During the
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and
other materials worth more than $1,000,000. In no sense
were their claims stale.
The Lockes fully complied with § 314's initial recordation
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the subsequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the
Ely, Nevada office of the BLM. There she inquired into how
and when they should file the assessment notice and was told,
among other things, that the documents should be filed at the
Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." Locke v.
United States, 573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following
this advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at
the Reno office on that date. On April4, 1981, they received
notice from the BLM that their mining claims were "abandoned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they
had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31. 2 It is this
one-day difference in good faith interpretation of the statutory deadline that gives rise to the present controversy.
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground."
2
The notice from the BLM also stated that "[s]ubject to valid intervening rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regulations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however,
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of common building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable
loss of their claims-the source of their livelihoods.
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JUSTICE STEVENS corre.etly points to a number of circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress
drafted§ 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let
alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1),
indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requiring filing "on or before December 31;" (iv) BLM, charged with
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 7. As
JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the
last, suggest not only that Congress drafted § 314 inartfully
but also that Congress may actually have intended to require
filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. This is
certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional
intent and is consistent with all the policies of the Act.
I do not believe, however, that given the special circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 16-18. In Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a]
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions
.... " ld., at 526 (emphasis added); accord Jackson v.
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where a
[forfeiture] provisio[n] . . . may be so unreasonable as to
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of
the court ... "). Furthermore, conditions, like those here,
imposed after a property interest is created must also meet

l
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due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require,
among other things, that there be no question as to what
actions an individual must take to protect his interests.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily.
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" creates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing
period ends. 3 Given the natural tendency to interpret this
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty
and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The statement in at least one of the Government's own publications
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Department of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a
property interest because a property holder reasonably believed that under the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than termi3
The Court believes it is "obligated to apply the 'prior to December 31'
language by its terms" because "its meaning is clear." Ante, at 11. Such
clarity, however, is not to be found in the words themselves. Courts, for
example, have used these same words in similar contexts clearly to mean
"by the end of the year," e. g., AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F. 2d 1096, 1108,
1115 (CA11983); Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F. 2d 1, 2 (CAl
1982), or have contrasted them with other phrases such as "[f]rom January
1," NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm. of New
York Harbor, 732 F. 2d 292, 295 and n. 6 (CA2), cert. denied,- U. S.
(1984), or "after December 31," Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F. 2d
266, 267 n. 3 (CA 7 1983), in ways that strongly suggest this meaning.
Various administrative agencies have also followed this same usage in
promulgating their regulations. E. g., 24 CFR § 570.423(b); 31 CFR
§ 515.560(i); 40 CFR § 52.1174.
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nating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633
(1878). Although ·the latter may rest on impossibility, the
former rests on good faith performance a day late of what
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of
property rights to the State.
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than
did § 314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the statutory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for
filing on December 31 to be invalid. 4
I accordingly dissent.

'Parties, of course, ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their
failing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as
to statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines clearly specified. Because of the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitutional concerns identified above, this case is unique.
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